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ABSTRACT
The Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge Project represents the culmination of a long
awaited fixed crossing over the Rio de la Plata that will link the area of Punta Lara
on the Argentine side (approximately 50 Km. south of Buenos Aires) with the
eastern area of the city of Colonia del Sacramento on the Uruguayan side. Thus,
the facility will comprise approximately 51 Km. of main bridges, viaducts, and road
connections to the highway networks of both countries.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the financial feasibility to deliver
the Bridge under a Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) scheme.
Therefore, the present research starts with an analysis of the issues that
influenced the decision to deliver the Bridge as a BOT project. It follows a
description of the Bridge's procurement development, feasibility studies, technical
aspects, financeability assessment, and modes of transportation currently operating
at the Rio de la Plata region. Subsequently, financial issues arisen during
construction and/or operation of similar BOT projects, such as the Channel Tunnel
and the Northumberland Bridge in Canada, are studied in order to identify relevant
facts applicable to the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge.
Next, a model that evaluates the financial feasibility to deliver the Bridge as a
BOT project is developed. Under a base-case scenario, the financial model
incorporates a host of assumptions such as possible sources of financing, capital
investment arrangements, and traffic levels and toll rates structures, among other
pertinent variables. The financial model then calculates the Net Present Value and
Internal Rate of Return of the concessionaire as a direct measure of the financial
viability of the project. Then, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the financial
model in order to test the project's flexibility to absorb an array of adverse
contingencies without jeopardizing the financial robustness of the venture. The
results of this analysis as well as its implications are studied in great detail.
Lastly, findings of this research are summarized as final conclusions.
Thesis Supervisor: Fred Moavenzadeh, Ph.D.
Title: George Macomber Professor of Construction Management
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge Project represents the culmination of a long
awaited fixed crossing over the Rio de la Plata that will link the area of Punta Lara
on the Argentine side (approximately 50 Km. south of Buenos Aires) with the
eastern area of the city of Colonia del Sacramento on the Uruguayan side. Thus,
the facility will comprise approximately 51 Km. of main bridges, viaducts, and road
connections to the highway networks of both countries. The distance between the
capitals, Buenos Aires and Montevideo, will thus be reduced to 258 Km.
approximately. The total construction cost, considering the most likely 4-lane
option and including road connections and expropriations, is about US$1,250
million (late-1994 US dollars).
The governments of Argentina and Uruguay resorted to a Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) option for delivering the project. Specifically, the awarded
concessionaire will be in charge of the finance, design, construction, operation,
and maintenance of the facility at its entire risk. The concession period will be up
to 35 years long.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the financial feasibility to
deliver the Bridge under a BOT scheme.
Therefore, the present research starts with an analysis of the issues, such as
the development of the MERCOSUR agreement, that influenced the decision to
deliver the Bridge as a BOT project.
After that, a description and analysis of the facts about the Bridge are
presented. The Bridge's procurement development and conclusions of the
feasibility studies, technical aspects, preliminary assessment of the Bridge's
financeability, and a description of the existing modes of transportation currently
operating at the Rio de la Plata region are topics of study.
Subsequently, financial issues arisen during construction and/or operation of
similar BOT projects, such as the Channel Tunnel and the Northumberland Bridge,
are studied in order to identify relevant facts applicable to the Buenos
Aires-Colonia Bridge.
Next, a model that evaluates the financial feasibility to deliver the Bridge as a
BOT project is developed. Under a base-case scenario, the financial model
incorporates a host of assumptions such as possible sources of financing, capital
investment structure, and traffic levels and toll rates structure, among other
pertinent variables. The financial model then calculates the Net Present Value and
Internal Rate of Return of the concessionaire as a direct measure of financial
viability to deliver the project under a BOT scheme.
Then, a sensitivity analysis is performed on the financial model in order to test
the project's flexibility to absorb an array of adverse contingencies without
jeopardizing the financial robustness of the venture. The results of this analysis as
well as its implications are studied in great detail.
Lastly, findings of the subject research are summarized as final conclusions.
CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT
2.1. Background
The Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge project stems from the political will of both
Argentina and Uruguay, within the framework of the Mercado ComOn del Sur
(Southern Common Market) or MERCOSUR. Therefore, it is important to briefly
analyze MERCOSUR's history and objectives in order to understand the dynamics
that are bringing the present project into existence.
2.1.1. MERCOSUR: History and Objectives
In spite of the fact that the formal launching of MERCOSUR occurred in March
1991 with the Asuncion Treaty signed by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and
Uruguay, the integration spirit in the region comes from far back and has a rich
experience as well as the multiple bilateral complementation agreements which
paved the way for the new enterprise.
A short while after the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community
(1954) and the European Economic Community (1957), Latin America was already
beginning to take its first steps towards regional integration. The treaty that
created the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC, by its acronym in
Spanish), signed in 1960, provided for the creation of a free-trade zone, by means
of periodical and selective negotiations between its member states. This choice -
as a product of negotiation among the member states rather than an automatic
reduction of import duties- made the ALALC trade opening program develop
reasonably well in its first years, lose impetus as of 1965, and almost come to a
complete standstill in the 70's. Thus, despite the ALALC had stimulated mutual
trading between member states, the distance between its original objectives and
the results obtained was very great.
The Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, by its acronym in Spanish),
created in 1980 to replace ALALC, used other means to attempt member state
integration. In place of the free-trade zone established by ALALC, an economic
preference zone was established creating conditions favorable to the growth of
bilateral initiatives, as a prelude to the institution of plurilateral relationships in
Latin America. ALADI thus made possible agreements and joint actions between
countries in the region which until then had only limited previous ties. The
establishment of a common market, however, was still the long-term objective.
Under the ALADI system, Brazil and Argentina signed in 1986 twelve
commercial protocols: their first concrete step towards the bringing of the two
countries closer together that had officially been started in 1985 under the
Declaration of Iguaqu. To supplement and improve on their former agreements,
Brazil and Argentina signed in 1988 a Treaty for Integration, Cooperation and
Development that set the stage for a common market between the two countries
within ten years, with the gradual elimination of all tariff barriers and harmonization
of the macro-economic policies of both nations. It was further established that this
agreement would be open to all other Latin American countries. After the adhesion
of Paraguay and Uruguay a new treaty was signed by all four countries on March
26, 1991, in Asuncion, Paraguay, providing for the creation of a common market
among the four participants, to be known as the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR, by its acronym in Spanish). The MERCOSUR agreement came into
effect as of January 1, 1995.
Bolivia, Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru have already evinced interest in
joining MERCOSUR. Other Latin American countries (also members of ALADI)
interested in joining MERCOSUR can initially do so through association
agreements with member nations, until full participation and conduct of a common
market has been achieved.
Within this context, for instance, Chile has already signed in June, 1996, a
cooperation agreement to gradually reduce its trade tariffs vis-a-vis MERCOSUR
nations as well as to enhance the trade and integration among such countries.
The objectives of the MERCOSUR agreement can be summarized as follows:
* Free transit of production goods, services and factors between the member
states with inter alia, the elimination of customs rights and lifting of non-tariff
restrictions on the transit of goods or any other measures with similar
effects;
* Establishment of a common external tariff and adoption of a common trade
policy with regard to nonmember states or groups of states, and the
coordination of positions in regional and international commercial and
economic meetings;
* Coordination of macro-economic and sectorial policies of member states
relating to foreign trade, agriculture, industry, taxes, monetary system,
exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications,
and any others they may agree on, in order to ensure free competition
between member states; and
The commitment by the member states to make the necessary adjustments
to their laws in pertinent areas to allow for the strengthening of the
integration process.
The Asuncion Treaty is based on the doctrine of the reciprocal rights and
obligations of the member states. MERCOSUR initially targeted free-trade zones,
then customs unification and, finally, a common market, where in addition to
customs unification the free movement of manpower and capital across the
member nations' international frontiers is possible, and depends on equal rights
and duties being granted to all signatory countries.
During the transition period, as a result of the chronological differences in
actual implementation of trade liberalization by the member states, the rights and
obligations of each party will initially be equivalent but not necessarily equal.
In addition to the reciprocity doctrine, the Asuncion Treaty also contains
provisions regarding the most-favored nation concept, according to which the
member nations automatically extend to the other Treaty signatories -after actual
formation of the common market- any advantage, favor, entitlement, immunity or
privilege granted to a product originating from or intended for countries that are not
part of ALADI.
2.1.2. Procurement Development of the Project
As mentioned above, the Buenos Aires-Colonia bridge is part of the dynamics
generated by MERCOSUR.
On August 10, 1985, Argentina and Uruguay signed an understanding that
covered the formation of a bilateral commission to study the viability of the Buenos
Aires-Colonia Bridge project, among other topics. The Bi-national Commission of
the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge (COBAICO, by its acronym in Spanish) came
thus into existence. Its mandate was to analyze the feasibility of a fixed river
crossing and to consider the possibilities of designing, constructing and operating
the facility.
In 1987, COBAICO prepared a pre-feasibility study that concluded that a fixed
river crossing is feasible under certain conditions. It also recommended that
further feasibility analysis needed to be conducted as a basis for the government's
decisions regarding the project.
In April, 1993, Argentina and Uruguay approved the selection of six companies
qualified to conduct the feasibility studies of the Bridge. A consulting team formed
by Louis Berger International, Inc., Bear Sterns & Co., and Latham & Watkins were
finally selected to conduct the aforementioned studies These studies were
financed by the World Bank and were expected to cost around four million dollars
(1993 Dollars).
In June 1995, this consulting team -with assistance from various other
consulting firms in Argentina, Uruguay, and other countries- presented to
COBAICO an executive summary of the preliminary studies for a fixed crossing
over the Rio de la Plata. Such studies were centered on five possible alignments.
From the financial standpoint, the executive summary concluded basically that
the construction of the bridge may be financed by private capital alone under
certain economic and toll scenarios. This fact is of important significance and
attractiveness for both governments of Argentina and Uruguay since a private
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financing of an infrastructure meant to strengthen the MERCOSUR dynamics at no
fiscal monetary expense is more than welcome by such governments.
Furthermore, the idea of having a facility financed with private-sector resources
corresponds to the existing political process of privatization of state-owned
enterprises carried out by Argentina and Uruguay.
In September 20, 1996, a Treaty for the construction of the bridge was signed
by the Presidents of Argentina and Uruguay, thus institutionalizing the political
commitment of both governments to build the facility and authorizing the beginning
of the bidding process. The Treaty determines that the facility will be delivered
under a BOT scheme. The concessionaire will be in charge of the finance,
construction, operation, and maintenance of the facility during a period of up 35
years. Additionally, the Treaty establishes the link Punta Lara-Colonia as the
selected alignment, among other important topics [Appendix 1].
Presently, COBAICO has issued the Request for Proposals documents (RFP)
in January, 1997.
It is expected that the construction of the bridge commences by mid 1998 and
that the opening of the facility takes place by 2003.
2.2. Conclusions of the Feasibility Studies
Below it is developed a summary of the conclusions of the feasibility studies
presented by the consulting team led by Louis Berger International, Bears & Stern,
and Latham and Watkins in June 1995.
They based their analysis on five possible alignments - A, B, C, D1, and D2, as
shown in the following figure:
Figure 2.1. Possible Alignments for the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge
The feasibility studies concluded on the following points:
a) Although the transportation system in the Rio de la Plata has shown some
improvement, the growing demand observed and expected in the future due
to regional integration, makes it imperative to find solutions to the current
20
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transportation problems. The construction of the bridge will solve many
problems which constrain the present service, such as:
* long time needed to travel by highway
* limitation in frequency of other transportation modes
* limitation in the number of automobiles transported by ferry, particularly
during peak seasons.
* delays in the departure of planes or ferries due to fog or other adverse
weather conditions, etc.
At present, these limitations inhibit and even prevent trips across the
river between Argentina and Uruguay. Therefore, considering that the
present travel times and costs are relatively high, the construction of the
bridge will undoubtedly produce an increase in trade and generate new
cargo and passenger traffic.
b) The construction of a bridge to cross the Rio de la Plata does not pose any
particular technical problem. The construction of a tunnel under the river
navigation channels would not be advantageous and would be significantly
more costly; therefore, it is not recommended. It was also concluded that
the most appropriate construction system for the main bridges in the
different alternatives would be a cable-stayed design with segmented
concrete deck; for the secondary crossings and high level viaducts, the use
of segmented concrete design is recommended; and, for the low level
viaducts, the pre-cast concrete system. For alignments D1 and D2, the
construction of highway embankments with hydraulic fill should be
considered. However, final decisions regarding detailed project engineering
must clearly be made by the eventual concessionaire.
c) With the exception of alignments D1 and D2, the construction of the project
does not require any additional investment in the highway systems of either
Argentina or Uruguay; it will be necessary, however, to complete several
projects presently under construction or in the planning or design stages in
both countries.
d) The bridge would need a minimum configuration of three lanes with a
central reversible lane, although the optimum configuration would be four
lanes. Given that, regional rail transportation is very limited at present, and
that the analysis indicates a concessionaire would not be able to recover
the additional costs, there is no commercial advantage to incorporating a
railway component into the bridge project.
e) The construction cost, including road connections and expropriations, range
between US$940 and US$ 1,260 million for a bridge with three lanes, an
between US$1,020 and US$1,360 million for a bridge with four lanes
(late-1994 US dollars). If the ranking of alternatives is done on the basis of
cost, the most economical would be alignment A, followed by alignments B,
D1, D2, and C. In all cases, the cost of the project's connection to the road
networks in Argentina and Uruguay is a relatively minor part of the total cost
(between US$34 and US$66 million, including expropriations).
f) The crossing of the Rio de la Plata at alignments A, B, and C does not pose
specific environmental problems, given that the work will not significantly
affect the river's hydrology. With respect to sedimentation in the navigation
channels due to bridge operations, it was concluded that, even in a worst
case scenario, the variation in the volume of sedimentation is negligible, as
compared with the several million cubic meters involved in annual channel
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maintenance. The construction of alignment B may require additional costs
and/or special considerations given the possible presence of toxic materials
near its starting point on the Argentine border. If this layout were selected,
this matter must be thoroughly investigated. The construction of the
crossing as per alternative D (in any of its variants) will require major
mitigation measures for environmental impacts. The bridge will have both a
socio-economic impact and an urban development impact in the Colonia
area, and in the case of alternative D, the impact will be on both ends of the
project.
g) Demand projections clearly indicate that the permanent crossing would
attract a substantial amount of current traffic and that the amount of traffic
generated due to the bridge construction will be very substantial. Bridge
traffic depend upon four main factors:
* different scenarios for economic growth
* its layout
* tolls
* competing services and their tariffs.
It is estimated that alignment B would attract the highest volume of traffic
(close to 5,650 vehicles daily in the year 2000, 7% of which are trucks, with
a US$75 toll charge per car, based on an average economic growth).
Alternatives B and C attract approximately the same number of vehicles;
alignment A around 5% less than B, while alignments D1 and D2 end up
with a smaller demand (around 15 to 20% less than that of alignment B).
h) The financial analysis concluded that a variety of financial and economic
scenarios exist in which the bridge would be self-sufficient, and that it would
be feasible to secure private financing in the form of a project concession.
The IRR would vary from 20% to 39% based on more than thirty different
combinations of alignments, tolls, and economic scenarios. The results are
very sensitive to the cost of capital. Alignment A generates the highest IRR,
even though it does not attract the largest traffic volume because it requires
an initial investment of about $100 to $300 million Dollars less than the
other alignments.
i) It is recommended that COBAICO consider the inclusion of complementary
projects related to travelers services, such as service stations, duty-free
shops, hotels and restaurants. This is because they have a good chance of
being profitable and of attracting private sector investments, before or
immediately after project construction. The income from these projects
would be collected by the concessionaire, or COBAICO could grant
separate concessions, capturing the various income streams as part of the
project financing. With respect to the more capital intensive and
speculative projects, a potential concessionaire would value the incomes
with a much higher discount factor than incomes from tolls. Therefore, these
complementary projects are not considered as having a significant impact,
because their worth would be substantially undervalued if included in the
project concession. In the future, however, projects with a broader scope
should be considered as possible sources of income for both governments.
j) The economic analysis concluded that the project is highly feasible from the
point of view of the countries involved in the venture. For alignment A, the
IRR varies between 16.4% under the most conservative scenarios with
respect to traffic volumes, cost (US$115 toll; 4 lanes) and methods used to
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calculate benefits; and 29.2% in the most optimistic case (US$0 and three
lanes). Alignment B is the most viable, with an IRR of 20.9% (US$115 toll
and 3 lanes), followed by alignment A (20.0%), C (17.1%), D1 (15.8%), and
D2 (15.0%). The results are not highly sensitive to the traffic level, and the
values of IRR are acceptable even with reductions of up to 30% in traffic
volume.
k) The construction of the Buenos Aires-Colonia bridge, its access roads and
its support and service infrastructure will produce a large temporary impact
on the economies of Uruguay and Argentina. It has been estimated that the
project will generate 32,395 person-years of work in Uruguay and 24,024
person-years in Argentina. According to estimates of the cost in labor,
materials, and services for alignment A (US$1,023 million), US$320 million
will be spent in Uruguay, US$443 million in Argentina and the remaining
US$260 million will come from foreign countries.
1) Based on the analysis of the five corridor alternatives, the best alignments
in terms of possible demand, economic benefits, and financial and
environmental aspects, can be ranked as follows:
Table 2.1. Ranking of Best Alignments
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RANKING OF BEST ALIGNMENTS
Financial Possible Economic Environmental
As ps I Demand Benefits Asps
A B
ALIGNMENT C B A
A A C
* From the financial point of view, alignment A, which connects Punta Lara
to the east area of Colonia, is most preferable since it requires the
smallest investment.
From the point of view of potential traffic demand, alignments B and C
attract the largest number of vehicles, followed closely by alignments A,
while alignments D1 and D2 show a lesser demand of around 15 to
20%.
* From the point of view of economic benefits, alignment B produces the
highest IRR, slightly higher than that of alignment A.
* From the point of view of environmental impact, alignments A and C do
not seem to pose any serious problem, although it is recommended that
a more detailed analysis of environmental impacts be carried out for any
alignment selected, including planning studies to control growth and
land use in Colonia'. In the case of alignment B, it is recommended that
the potential presence of toxic waste be examined. Alignment D1 would
probably result in more significant impacts that should be analyzed in
depth. Generally, the impacts of alignment D2 will be similar, although
not as serious as those of alignment D1.
1 On December 5th, 1995, Colonia del Sacramento was declared in Berlin Human Cultural Heritage
Site by UNESCO. It turns out to be obvious the need for a well thought land-use planning in order
not to alter the historical preponderance of this city.
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* From the point of view of risks, alignment D1 and D2 show a
substantially higher risk level, including:
* risk of significant environmental impact during construction and
operation. Within this risk, the possibility of work interruption by
international environmental organizations exists;
* risk of delays and construction cost overruns which may even make
the project unfeasible as a BOT type of venture;
* risk of litigation spurred by the owners of adjacent land, due to
possible changes in the hydraulic conditions of the river;
* all these risks become more relevant in a BOT type of project, since
a number of them would have to be assumed by the concessionaire.
In conclusion, the choice of an alignment depends upon the relative
importance placed on the different points of view. Based on the studies, the
conclusions is that any of the alternative designs could be feasible, but
alignments A and B produce the highest results as concession projects,
from the financial and economic point of view. In view of the high financial
risk associated for the project, alignment A constitutes the most prudent
selection should the governments decide to construct the project with
private capital alone.
m) The eventual financing of the project by international capital markets will be
affected by many of the features that make it unique, such as:
* the size of the project and the needed investment,
* its bi-national character,
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* the fact that both countries, Argentina and Uruguay, belong to the so-
called "emerging markets", and
* the lack of precedents on projects of this magnitude in non-developed
areas.
Consequently, the results of the financial analysis represent only one of
the factors that will determine the eventual financing of the project. The
level of risks associated with the financing, construction, and operation of
the bridge is too high to conclude with total certainty that the bridge is
"financeable". However, the viability of the project is possible in light of the
enormous importance of the bridge as an infrastructure project that will
facilitate economic integration of the MERCOSUR countries; the positive
economic impact that the project will have for Argentina and Uruguay; and
the fact that the project may be financed by private capital alone under
certain economic and toll scenarios.
2.3. Technical Facts
2.3.1. Structural Alternatives
The Treaty signed by the Presidents of Argentina and Uruguay on September
20, 1996, stipulated that alignment A is going to be the final location of the Bridge
[Annex 1].
The structural configuration for alignment A would basically comprise one main
crossing, one secondary crossing, and high-level and low-level viaducts.
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Therefore, several structural options for each component of the Bridge are
summarized below. These options are based on the alternatives taken into
consideration in the feasibility studies conducted by the consulting team led by
Louis Berger International, Bears & Stern, and Latham and Watkins.
a) Main Crossing:
A single 450 meters span is required over the junction of the two main
accesses of navigation to the Port of Buenos Aires. Also, a minimum vertical
clearance of 50 meters is required in order to provide for a wider section to be
used by the larger vessels on their way to either of such two channels.
Besides the tunnel alternative which was later discarded, the consulting team
considered the two following alternatives:
* a single-span tied arch, with a total length of 450 meters
* a cable-stayed bridge made of three sections, with a total length of 850
meters
The cable-stayed option would feature two side spans of 200 meters for each
side of the center span, as shown in the following figure:
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Figure 2.2. Cable-Stayed Main Bridge Option
b) Secondary Crossing:
One secondary crossing with clear spans of 100 meters and 30-meter vertical
clearance is needed near the Uruguayan coastline for the free passage of cruise
vessels, sailboats and smaller freighters without the 8- to 10-meter draft of those
using the main channels.
The structural solutions evaluated for this bridge component were as follows:
* steel girder-floorbeam-stringer systems
* steel trusses
* segmental precast concrete box girder system
The last alternative is the most efficient in these spans because of local
availability of the construction material and low maintenance cost. The
recommended configuration is three continuous spans, with a 100 m. center span
and 65 m. side spans.
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c) High-level Viaducts:
It would be used high- and low-level viaducts to connect the approaches to the
main and secondary crossings, as shown in the following figure:
Figure 2.3. Viaducts
The high-level viaducts evaluated were:
* Precast segmented concrete box girder system
* Pre-stressed Bulb-T girders
It was determined that the most efficient range of spans for the precast
segmented concrete box girder system is 75 meters, placed continuously for as
many as four spans when the pier height above water level is more than 20
meters.
d) Low-level Viaducts:
For the remainder of the Rio de la Plata crossing, the minimum clearance
required is 6.5 meters above the "0" datum at Riachuelo River, based on expected
water and wave levels. The lengths of these viaducts have been determined by
studies comparing the total minimum cost per square meter for different
configurations. Since the vast majority of the project's overall length is made up by
these low-level viaducts, the project's feasibility depends to a large extent on the
cost/effectiveness ratio of the structural solutions adopted for the low level viaduct
spans.
The following superstructure types have been considered for the project
sections containing low-level viaducts:
* Steel multi-girder structures, continuous and/or simply supported
* Precast concrete multi-girder structures, continuous and/or simply
supported
The recommended alternative for the low-level viaducts is pre-stressed precast
Bulb-T beams made composite with the concrete deck to support live loads. From
the point view of economy in construction and efficiency of operation, a four-span
configuration is recommended.
2.3.2. Sub-Structural Alternatives
The Rio de la Plata is located on the East coast of South America, draining the
second largest drainage basin of the continent (3,170,000 km2) and the first one in
terms of population and economic importance. the Rio de la Plata is a
funnel-shaped coastal plain tidal river with a semi-enclosed shelf area at the
mouth and a river palaeovalley at the northern coast favoring river discharge and
sediment transport to the adjacent continental shelf. Morphological studies allowed
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to recognize areas with particular features characterized as "morphological units".
Surface bottom sediments distribution must be interpreted on a general context of
long term graded and selective sedimentation. In such context, dynamic elements
(differential contribution of the main tributaries, two main transport pathways,
localization of sedimentation processes) and historical-stratigraphical elements
(relict sediments masking actual processes), are involved.
Geotechnical investigations including borings to a maximum depth of 60 meters
(if not previously encountering rozk) and of 10 meters in dense sands were
performed.
The results obtained served as a basis for the following conclusions:
a) There are two well defined subsurface strata:
* A stratum with considerably thick layers of low consistency sediments
lying, with practically no transition, on fine and very dense sands known
as "puelchenses". This situation occurs in about 80% of the area
investigated.
* A stratum near the Uruguayan coastline, where transition-type soils exist
on underlying rocks.
b) Consequently, the use of large diameter excavated piles were adopted for
the foundation design of viaducts and main crossing. The piles would get
embedded 5 diameters in dense sands, and 1.5 to 3 diameters in rock for
viaducts and main crossing, respectively.
2.3.3. Super-Structural Alternatives
With regard to the cross section, a four-lane configuration is preferred, as
shown in the following figure:







However, two alternatives have been considered for possible superstructure
configuration:
a) Two lanes in each direction with shoulders:
This scenario provides for four 3.65 m. wide lanes and 1.7 m. shoulders on
each side and a central barrier. On a traffic more than 40 kilometers long, the
first safety concern is to make sure that on-coming traffic should be separated
by a New Jersey-type of physical barrier. Driving for approximately 30 minutes,
very close to on-coming traffic, and without a divider can be highly dangerous
and conducive to head-on collisions. The Bridge capacity with four lanes during
Shoulder >6
peak hour is approximately 2,000 vehicles/hour per lane. These volumes
exceed traffic forecasts.
b) One lane per direction with a reversible central lane and shoulders for
disabled vehicles:
This second scenario features two 3.65 m. -wide lanes, with shoulders
1.7m. wide and a reversible central lane for operation during peak hours. A
system of movable barriers, like the Movable Rapid Interchange Barriers,
would provide for a reversible central lane. In order to separate on-coming
traffic, a divider such as a New Jersey-type of barrier could be used. This
system is in operation in the United States and France and consists of a series
of concrete barriers that are moved by a transfer vehicle using a special
interchange system. Transfer vehicles are capable of moving the barrier
system one entire lane in a single pass.
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2.4. Preliminary Financeability Assessment
The US Trade and Development Agency and CG/LA Infrastructure - a US firm
specialized in Latin American markets - developed a preliminary assessment of
the financeability of the project. The report was presented at the TDA Conference
on Infrastructure Opportunities in South America held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in
November, 1995.
They pointed out that the privatization of the transportation sector has been
extremely successful in Argentina. The International Finance Corporation has
announced the financing of a green toll road in Buenos Aires suburbs, and historic
first. A number of concessions for rail lines were also awarded. The landslide
reelection of the Argentine President Menem indicates continued support for
these policies. Although, Uruguay's record in this respect is more mixed, the
country granted its first highway concession in 1994, and the new government led
by President Sanguinetti is dedicated to the success of the bridge project.
Moreover, the two countries have a successful track record in the realization of
joint infrastructure projects, such as the Salto Grande Dam on the Uruguay River.
The basic underlying issue, however, is whether the costs of such an ambitious
undertaking can be recouped through tolls reasonable enough to attract sufficient
travelers and truck traffic.
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The report also included a financeability profile of the project which is
summarized in the following chart:
Figure 2.5. Project Profile Financeability
PROJECT PROFILE FINANCEABILITY
Economic Regulatory
Demand economic Political RegulatorFactors
Revenue Technical
Sveams
Financeability ratings above are given on a scale of 1 to 3, with 3 being the
highest rating. The ratings are preliminary assessments, using existing data, of the
impact of a given factor on project financeability - and thus the likelihood that the
project will proceed in a timely fashion. These are not based on detailed cash flow
assessments or credit ratings of individual companies or government institutions.
Nor are they based on a detailed credit analysis of the project because, quite
simply, insufficient information is available.
Rating are qualitative and broad stroke. A rating near "1" indicates that the
factor is considered to be an extreme impediment to the project's financeability and
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thus its viability. On the other end a rating near "3" indicates that the factor
supports the project's financeability and presents few obstacles to a potential
lender or investor. A rating of "2" is important as it indicates an area that is
problematic, must be carefully monitored, and needs resolution for the project to
proceed. At the same time, unlike a rating of "1", it is assessed that the obstacles
are potentially resolvable.
Financeability rating is a subjective business. Therefore, ratings should not be
used to rank the project - rather to flag areas that will need to be addressed by the
concessionaire. Many issues associated with lower rankings can be overcome with
the correct financial and commercial strategy.
The six factors on which the project financeability assessment is based are
driven by the following considerations:
* Economic Demand: Is there a strong economic need driving the project with
many beneficiaries?
* Macro-economic factors: How stable and secure is the country's
macro-economic situation including the risk of devaluation?
* Political: Are there strong political pressures to push the project forward?
* Reaulatory Structure: Are adequate government regulations in place to
protect the rights of the investor or concession owner? Are the rules of the
game clear or do ambiguities exist that might hurt the concessionaire?
* Revenue Stream: How secure is the flow of funds that will provide an
adequate rate of return on the initial investment?
* Technical: Are there technical issues that might impact on the ability to
complete the project or for the project to operate according to plan?
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2.5. Existing Modes of Transportation at the Rio de la Plata Region2
The Rio de la Plata region between Argentina and Uruguay is connected by
four transportation modes, three of which capture a significant share of the total
market: maritimelferry, highway and air transportation. The table below presents a
summary of the connections and services available through each of the different
modes. Rail service is only available for transporting freight over the Salto Grande
Dam.
Table 2.2. Existing Modes of Transportation at the Rio de la Plata Region
MODE CONNECTION MAIN SERVICES TERMINAUCROSSINGS
Buenos Aires- Buquebus Port of Buenos Aires/Port of
Montevideo Montevideo
Maritime/Ferry Buenos Aires-Colonia Ferrylineas/ Port of Buenos Aires/Port of
Buquebus/Aliscafos Colonia
Fray Bentos-Puerto Condor/COT/ETSA/ Gral. San Martin Bridge
Unzu6 CITA
Roadway Paysandu - Col6n Gral. Artigas Brdge
Salto Grande Dam Salto Grande Dam
Buenos Aires - Aerolineas Aeroparque/Carrasco
Montevideo Argentinas/Pluna
Air Buenos Aires - Punta Aerolineas Aeroparque I/Punta del Este
del Este Argentinas/Pluna
Buenos Aires - LAPA Aeroparque/Colonia
Colonia
Railway Salto Grande Dam Salto Grande Dam
Approximately 4.5 million passengers crossed the Rio de la Plata in 1994,
using the three main modes operating between Argentina and Uruguay: river (ferry
from Buenos Aires and La Plata City to Colonia and Montevideo), air (Buenos
2 Louis Berger International, Inc., et al., Preliminary Studies - Rio de la Plata Crossing - Executive
Summary, Argentina, June 1995.
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Aires to Colonia, Montevideo and Punta del Este) and highway (via Fray Bentos,
PaysandO and Salto). Over the last ten years this traffic has grown at an annual
rate of 5.5%. The effect of the bridge construction will result itself in a diversion of
river and air traffic towards the roadway system and in a reallocation among the
routes in the latter mode.
The cargo volume currently transported between Argentina and Uruguay is
approximately 535,000 tons (1992). Of this, 518,500 tons are moved through the
existing bridges and ports, 16,000 tons by rail (Salto Grande) and approximately
500 tons by air. The impact of the bridge over current freight traffic will be
essentially a reallocation of routes over a portion of the roadway system.
In the following figure, travel times and costs between Buenos Aires and
Montevideo are compared by contrasting existing services with those that would
become available through the proposed Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge. It should be
emphasized that the proposed Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge will offer a service
with drastically reduced travel time as compared with the current road service, and
with significantly lower costs than existing air and rapid ferry services.
Figure 2.6. Cost and Travel-Duration Comparison of Modes of Transportation
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Duration in Hours
(One Way)
Bus via Bs.As.-Colonia Bridge
Automobile via Bs.As.-Colonia Bridge
Bus via San Martin Bridge









In 1994, the maritime/ferry mode carried 45% of the passenger traffic between
the two countries, while air and road had shares of approximately 36% and 19%,
respectively, as it is represented in the figure below:
Figure 2.7. Participation by Mode in the Passenger Market
2.5.1. Maritime/Ferry Mode
This mode carries the highest share of the total market, with close to 45% of
the passengers transported in 1994, or a total of about 2 million passengers
annually. Currently, three companies offer ferry services connecting Greater
Buenos Aires with Montevideo and Colonia: Ferrylineas, Buquebus and Aliscafos
(which was recently acquired by Buquebus). Other launch services connect the
Delta with Carmelo.








The key features of the fleets operated by the three main companies are
detailed in the following table:
Table 2.3. Technical Characteristics of the Existing Ferry System
Eladia Isabel Catamaran 12 1200 90/4 1986
Silvia Ana Ferry 13 700 55/12 1966
Patricia Olivia Catamaran 39 500 60 1992
Juan L. Catamaran 39 500 60
FERRILINEAS
Ciudad de Bs.As. Ferry 11 1000 170/22 1964
Mianic Ferry 14 720 70 1961Mihanovich
Atlantic II Catamaran 38 495 60 1990
ALISCAFOS
Farall6n Hovercraft 35 134 1972
Tyrving Hovercraft 35 134 1972
Flecha de Colonia Hovercraft 32 140 1961
Flechade Bs.As. Hovercraft 32 140 1961
* x/y = automobiles/trucks
The three main companies provide service between Buenos Aires and Colonia,
with an increase in service frequency during the peak season in summer. Only
Buquebus offers a direct service between Buenos Aires and Montevideo, while the
three companies compete directly for the traffic between Buenos Aires and
Colonia. Generally, the high-speed ferry services have increased their share in the
market. The high-speed ferry service between Buenos Aires and Montevideo
provided by Buquebus is one of the best in the world, as it uses high-speed
catamaran boats (39 knots per hour) and modem terminals. Buquebus has also
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indicated its interest in improving its service and has added a new ship to its fleet
capable of reaching speeds of 55 knots per hour
It has been estimated that the existing capacity of the three main companies'
ferry fleet offers the potential to increase significantly the volume of traffic between
Buenos Aires and Colonia (a potential growth of about 500%, or more than 2
million, in number of passengers, but only a 260% growth, or about 170,000, in
number of cars transported during the peak season). Additionally, it was also
concluded that Buquebus has significant unused capacity in its ferry service
between Buenos Aires and Montevideo. It is likely that the profit margin of
high-speed ferry operations are sufficiently high to allow for a fleet expansion and
an increase in the level of service in the long term.
2.5.2. Air Mode
The air transportation mode represents a significant portion of the total travel
market between Buenos Aires and Uruguay, with about 19% of passengers
transported by air in 1994 or a total of approximately 860,000 passengers
annually. The demand for air travel between Uruguay and Buenos Aires is
presently met by Aerolineas Argentinas and PLUNA (to Montevideo and Punta del
Este) and LAPA (to Colonia). These routes are basically served by a narrow body
of aircraft.
The main infrastructure for air connection between the two countries includes
three commercial airports in Uruguay: Colonia, Carrasco (Montevideo) and
Capitln Curbelo (Punta del Este) and two in Buenos Aires: Ezeiza and
Aeroparque. On the Argentine side, Aeroparque is the principal airport for flights to
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Uruguay. It is located on the bank of the Rio de la Plata, adjacent to Buenos Aires'
commercial center. PLUNA and Aerolineas Argentinas operate a shuttle service
between Aeroparque and Carrasco, which offers the option to the user of more
than 8 daily flights using either one of the two companies.
The average number of daily jet takeoffs and landings at Aeroparque is 75.3;
reaching as high as 83 in a peak day, which implies a moderate utilization level for
a single-runway airport. To increase the capacity of this route, larger planes could
be used or the numbed of flights could be increased. The consideration of these
two factors together would result in a larger number of available seats or a
significant capacity increase.
Aeroparque's primary limitation is the number of aircraft aprons (20), although
there is the possibility of rapid expansion by building four new aprons on existing
land. The runway's capacity poses no problem since, in a single-runway operation,
a takeoff or landing can take place every two minutes, under normal conditions.
It is concluded that with a number of pragmatic improvement measures
(increase in the number of ticket counters; increase in the number of flights, and in
the average capacity of planes, plus the construction of four new aprons), it is
possible to increase significantly the passenger traffic between Aeroparque and
Uruguay, without incurring major construction expenditures.
On the Uruguayan side, the three airports have ample capacity to allow for an
increase in the number of flights to Buenos Aires. About 50% of the total
passenger traffic originating at Carrasco (Montevideo's airport, and Uruguay's
main air facility) corresponds to the shuttle service to Buenos Aires Aeroparque.
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The shuttle service has a few shortcomings, namely frequency limitations, lack
of diversified ticket options (for instance, different fares for different seasons, days
or hours of travel) and the excessively long time needed between arrival at the
airport and aircraft boarding. Solving these problems would not be difficult and an
improvement in the travel market share would be feasible. Low season tickets and
reduced processing time for passengers traveling between Punta del Este and
Aeroparque could also result in a larger number of users, though on a smaller
scale than that of Montevideo.
In conclusion, low-cost alternatives exist that would produce an increase in the
number of shuttle passengers, for those market segments which do not require
travel by car, or who are very sensitive to air fare costs.
2.5.3. Highway Mode
Road transportation satisfies a significant portion of the total travel demand
between Buenos Aires and Uruguay. About 36% of passengers traveled by road in
1994, or a total of about 1.6 million passengers annually. Furthermore, the majority
of the freight volume moved between Argentina and Uruguay uses the Uruguay
River bridges, with the exception of a small portion taken by train (through Salto
Grande), plane or ferry (through the Port of Colonia).
At present, there are three bridges over the Rio Uruguay connecting Argentina
and Uruguay:
1) Libertador General San Martin Bridge (Fray Bentos-Puerto Unzue)
2) General Artigas Bridge (Colonia-PaysandO~)
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3) Salto Grande Dam Complex (Salto-Concordia).
In addition, there is the G. Vargas - A.P. Justo Bridge (Paso de los Libres -
Uruguayana), connecting Argentina and Brazil, as shown in the map below:
Figure 2.8. Location of Existing Road Crossings
1) Libertador General San Martin Bridge (Fray Bentos - Port Unzu6)
The General San Martin Bridge is the closest to Buenos Aires (about 230
kilometers) and represents the most direct highway route between Buenos Aires
and Montevideo or Colonia. As a result, this bridge handles the majority of the
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road traffic in the area surrounding the project. The average annual daily traffic
(AADT) is 780 vehicles/day (1993), with 25% being heavy vehicles. The highest
number of vehicles is recorded during mid-January with 3024 vehicles/day (1994).
Under these conditions, there is no problem with traffic congestion; rather
congestion tends to occur at the border crossing where vehicles must stop to
comply with Police (Immigration) and Customs regulations.
2) General Artigas Bridge (Col6n - Paysandi)
This bridge is located about 310 km. from Buenos Aires. The average daily
traffic is 730 v/pd, with peaks of 2,285 v/pd recorded in January of 1994, but with a
larger percentage of local vehicles than the Libertador General San Martin Bridge.
The level of service is good and, as in the previous case, any delay during periods
of greater demand is due to border administrative procedures which will be
minimized under the MERCOSUR framework.
3) Salto Grande Complex (Salto - Concordia)
The third bridge between Argentina and Uruguay is located approximately 430
kilometers from Buenos Aires, crossing the Rio Uruguay on the crest of the Salto
Grande Dam. The characteristics describing the two other crossings apply to this
one as well, except that in this case there is also a train connection which affects
the traffic. When a train must cross the bridge the highway traffic is interrupted for
an hour, as the tracks occupy a portion of the roadway. This situation occurs only
a few times a week.
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4) G. Vargas - A.P. Justo Bridge (Paso de los Libres - Uruguayana)
This bridge, the first one built over the Uruguay River, joins the towns of Paso
de los Libres (Argentina) and Uruguayana (Brazil). The width of the paved
roadway is 6.30 meters, and the facility is almost 50 years old. The traffic volume
is high due to local traffic and a large percentage of trucks. Next to the highway
bridge runs an independent railway line linking the Argentine and Brazilian rail
systems.
In general terms it can be said that the Argentine and Uruguayan road
networks provide an adequate connection to the border crossings. They consist,
for the most part, of paved 2-lane roads, whose condition varies from good to
good-fair. A significant section of the Argentine network and the "Interbalnearia"
(turnpike that links Montevideo and Punta del Este) in Uruguay operate under a
concession system that suggests good maintenance standards for the future.
In the last five years there has been a sustained increase in the number of
motor vehicles both in Argentina and Uruguay. Among the MERCOSUR countries,
and among the countries in South America as a whole, Argentina and Uruguay
show the highest indices of motor vehicle ownership.
International passenger bus services operate by means of a system of permits
issued to private operators who serve regularly-scheduled routes. The current
operators are solid, well-established companies, with a substantial fleet to provide
the services. The Argentine as well as the Uruguayan companies pool their
resources, supposedly to lower their costs and to improve passenger services.
48
Cargo is carried by private operators, with freedom to contract out, both for
users and professional freight truckers. The users, and the public in general, are
protected by transportation safety procedures, especially with regard to certain
types of cargo. Regulations are also in place to preserve the road infrastructure
(weight limits per vehicle axle, vehicle tare, type of road surface, etc.) in a manner
consistent with the framework of the MERCOSUR agreements. The document
known as MIC/DTA (International Cargo Manifesto/Customs Traffic Statement),
currently in use by MERCOSUR and Andean Pact countries, is beginning to solve
one of the most complex issues in international land transportation.
Although the volume of freight currently crossing the Rio de la Plata corridor is
relatively low, it is an important potential traffic source for the Buenos Aires -
Colonia Bridge, particularly the freight which is to be moved between the regional
ports and between Argentina and Brazil. In light of this, the following items are
worthy of consideration:
The traffic between the Montevideo and Buenos Aires ports. The impact of
the Bridge on this system would emerge from the fact that one of the two
ports could capture freight from the other, if costs were low enough for the
cargo en route to one of the countries to be unloaded in the other country's
port as transit cargo and then, on board a truck, to cross the bridge to arrive
at its final destination. Currently, the volume of cargo traffic between the
ports of Montevideo and Buenos Aires is minor (on the order of 50,000 tons,
excluding Argentine fuel imports), and there is no present in-transit traffic
between the regional ports.
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The highway freight traffic between Argentina and Brazil, presently uses the
Uruguayana - Paso de los Libres crossing. In 1993 approximately 98,607
fully-loaded trucks crossed the border, or approximately 270 trucks per day.
The greatest portion of transported volume currently goes from San Paulo
and Curitiba to Porto Alegre; continues then to Uruguayana, and crosses
the border into Argentina at Paso de los Libres, with Buenos Aires as its
main final destination.
With respect to highway traffic between Argentina and Brazil, even though it is
possible to travel through Uruguayan territory, vehicles do not currently exercise
this option because of the negligible savings in distance difficulties, such as:
* two customs check-points to cross instead of one,
* cumbersome Uruguayan customs procedures,
* the lower transportation costs in Brazil make it less expensive for the freight
owner to use Brazilian operators for a portion of the trip, instead of using an
Argentine trucker for its entire length.
* the existence of freight warehouses in Uruguayana encourages the transfer
of cargo, and allows the truckers to move their equipment even when the
commercial documentation involved is incomplete. In addition, the
no-charge policy permits the freight owners to benefit by deferring payment
of duties or by waiting for better prices at the market of final destination.
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The implementation of the MERCOSUR Agreement, however, should produce
positive impacts on the above items: almost immediately upon the first two by
elimination of customs roadblocks; later on the third one, as a consequence of the
"regionalization" of the economies which would tend to generate similar costs in
the participating countries; and finally, more gradually, on the last item. As a result,
it is feasible to think in terms of a diversion, at least in part, of cargo shipped
between Argentina and Brazil, towards the alternative routes traversing Uruguayan
territory.
CHAPTER 3: SIMILAR BOT PROJECTS
The Channel Tunnel, linking the United Kingdom and France, and the
Northumberland Bridge in Canada stand out as recent BOT projects with complex
procurement processes. Therefore, the lessons learned from these projects can be
somehow applied to the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge.
3.1. Channel Tunnel
The $15 billion Channel Tunnel makes the old dream of a ground link between
Great Britain and continental Europe a reality for the first time since the Ice Ages.
The Channel Tunnel is one of Europe's biggest infrastructure projects ever. Some
facts of this project are outlined in the following points:
* The Channel Tunnel consists of a North and South running tunnel, and a
Service tunnel which runs between.
* Its length is 50 Km. (31 miles), of which 37 Km. (23 miles) are underwater.
* Its average depth is 46 meters (150 feet) under the seabed.
* The channel crossing time for Eurostar is only 20 minutes. Eurostar is the
company that operates train services through the Channel Tunnel. Eurostar
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links three European capitals, namely Brussels, London, and Paris; it can
run on various track clearances; and it can be powered by three different
electrical systems (overhead wires in Belgium and France, third rail in
Britain).
* 95 miles of tunnels were dug by nearly 13,000 engineers, technicians and
workers.
* The volume of rubble removed from the tunnel is three times greater than
that of the Cheops Pyramid in Egypt. It has increased the size of Britain by
90 acres. Equivalent to 68 football fields, this area has been made into a
park.
Since the Channel Tunnel is one of the most frequently cited recent
applications of Build/Operate/Transfer delivery method, a description of its
characteristics and financial aspects are briefly summarized in the following
sections.
3.1.1. Chronology of the Project
* March 1986: The French and the United Kingdom governments signed a 55
year Concession agreement with the Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. and
France-Manche SA. The companies are now known as Eurotunnel.
* December 1993: The Channel Tunnel was designed and built for its
operators, Eurotunnel, by Transmanche Link (TML), a joint venture of five
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British and five French construction companies. TML formally handed over
the project to Eurotunnel in December 1993.
* May 1994: The fixed link was inaugurated by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth
II, and President Francois Mitterrand on May 6, 1994. As part of the
ceremony, the two heads of state each traveled by Eurostar train to the
French terminal at Coquelles, where the two trains drew up nose-to-nose at
the platform. The initial ribbon cutting ceremony took place in France, the
parties then traveled by "Le Shuttle" to Folkestone where a further
ceremony took place.
* May 1994: The HGV service began commercial operation on May 19, 1994.
* June 1994:The Freight service began operations on June 1, 1994.
* November 1994: Eurostar services began operations on November 14,
1994.
* December 1994: Eurotunnel Tourist Shuttle services began operations on
December 22, 1994.
3.1.2. Eurotunnel's Financial Scheme During Construction
In 1985, the British and French governments invited proposals for a
commercially managed tunnel to run beneath the English Channel. It would be
developed, financed, built, and operated by the private sector without any
government subsidies. The winning plans were submitted jointly by the channel
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Tunnel Group and France Manche, which formed twin holding companies,
Eurotunnel PLC and Eurotunnel SA, chartered in Great Britain and France,
respectively. This private project operates under an Anglo-French treaty that
grants a fifty-five-year concession to build and operate the tunnel and allows the
consortium the right to set its own commercial policies, including pricing.
The original owner consortium included five leading French and British banks
and ten construction companies, which provided $84 million in the first of three
equity tranches (Equity I, II, and III) that would eventually total $1 billion raised out
of 745,000 (mostly French) shareholders. This developmental financing gave the
owners tight control; they divided construction contracts and the lead finance
management among themselves. The initial equity investment also covered some
of the credit risk during the development phase.
They subsequently obtained credit enhancement of the equity capital through a
syndicated bank loan of $8.4 billion provided by some 220 banks (primarily
Japanese, French, British and German). Approximately $1.68 billion of the loan
was a standby agreement designed to cover possible cost overruns or
unexpectedly high inflation rates. This bank loan was unique in that up to 60
percent of the loan could be taken in the form of letters of credit.
It is clear that in this project the equity and debt financing were structured to
support one another. The bank loan was arranged before the bulk of the equity
financing was raised, so that potential investors had confidence that the remainder
of the financing required to build the tunnel was in place. The equity base was
similarly essential to the debt in giving lenders confidence that the company was
adequately capitalized.
As is true of any transportation project, political risk was a major concern during
the construction phase. Apparently, some of the banks that took part in the
syndicated loan found it hard to imagine that either government would walk away
from a project in which so much political and national prestige had been invested
(this assumption illustrates the de facto recourse of the lenders to the
governments).
Yet, certain institutional investors who approached the second equity tranche
of $346 million were concerned over the delay of legislation supporting the project
in both countries. Because they were not assured of strong political backing,
investors were reluctant to purchase shares in Eurotunnel even though they stood
to earn a 17 percent return if they held the shares for the entire fifty-five-year
concession period. Fortunately, the legislation passed and the governments
indirectly ensured successful launching of Equity II.
Both lenders and equity investors in Eurotunnel assumed completion and
operating risks in return for the high potential payoff. Project managers devised an
elaborate structure of rewards and penalties to ensure on-time, in-budget project
completion. Payment to contractors was divided into a number of tranches,
reflecting the varying degrees of risk. All underground construction was based on
a target cost to which a gross profit of 12.36 percent was added. If the cost was
under budget, the contractor would received 50 percent of the savings; if budget
was exceeded, the contractor would pay 30 percent of the overrun, up to a limit of
6 percent of the target cost. Most of the rest of the construction (e.g.: terminals)
were to be paid for on a lump sum basis that emphasized the contractors' ability to
benefit from good performance.
The creditors options were limited should the project got into serious trouble.
Under the terms of the loan agreements, banks did not have the right to substitute
a new company if the project went into default based on specified debt coverage
rate. Moreover, banks managed some of their completion risk by stipulating a right
to withdraw from the loans if Equity III had failed. As it turned out, the third equity
tranche was fully financed.
Equity III was also contingent on the signing of contracts with the British and
French state-owned railroads. Economic analyses and traffic projections during the
development phase indicated that the project was highly robust with respect to the
main external risk, namely revenue shortfall. Yet, given the extreme importance of
cash flow in the project finance, such favorable projections did not generate as
much confidence as they would have in a more traditional asset-based financing.
Consequently, the railroads were convinced to shoulder more of the risk.
Approximately 41 percent of the operating revenues were expected to come
from payments by the railways, which agreed to pay a minimum usage charge
equivalent to the income generated by 60 percent of the projected tunnel traffic per
year for the first twelve years of the concession. This effectively was to underwrite
all of Eurotunnel's operating costs during this period.
In accordance with the initial projections, Eurotunnel planned for 1995 to begin
dividend payments on equity and to refinance its loans with other debt instruments.
These were designed to match the debt maturities to the project's long-term
revenue-generating profile. As Eurotunnel cannot diversify into other business
activities without permission of the Anglo-French Inter-government Commission
supervising the project, and as the Tunnel would cost little to run and maintain, the
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company would have no significant need to retain earnings during the operational
phase of the project.
The exchange rate risk that Eurotunnel was to face in meeting its currency
requirements for servicing investors was covered through a £1,000 million loan
from the European Investment Bank, to be made available primarily in British
sterling and French francs. The loan was to be drawn over several years at the
prevailing market rates of interest for terms of up to twenty-five years.
Thus, as this project has evolved, its manager had intended to design financial
arrangements that allocated each principal risk to the party best able to manage
and bear it. In the process, they facilitated the self-financing of a project that had
been the fancy of sovereigns and their subjects for centuries.
3.1.3. Current Status of the Venture
In 1995, Eurotunnel realized $453 million of revenues. This figure, however, is
completely offset by the current company's debt which has tripled to nearly $13
billion, a whopping 13 times its current market capitalization. This debt is due to
the fact, among others, that construction of the Tunnel extended one year more
than the projected seven-year schedule.
In September, 1995, Eurotunnel hinted an imminence of bankruptcy when it an-
nounced an 18-month moratorium on paying its interest. Now, Eurotunnel is
negotiating a restructuring of its debt with its 220 banks while interest costs are
skyrocketing twice as fast as revenue.
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Presently, half of Eurotunnel's equity is worth about $500 million, or 4 percent
of the company's debt. In 1986, France Manche/Channel Tunnel Group's original
bid was $5.6 billion. Eight years later, construction costs had doubled to $11
billion. Of that $11 billion, shareholders invested $4.6 billion, and two development
banks together invested $3.4 billion. That means shareholders and junior creditors
(who had no security on the assets) supplied $8 billion, or 73 percent of the
project's construction costs. In contrast, the 220 banks supplied $3 billion (not
including financial costs), or 27 percent of the project's construction costs. But now
the banks are claiming roughly $12.8 billion in debt.
Such a financial distress is attributed mainly to revenues lower than expected,
construction costs overruns, and a faulty conflict resolution system in the
construction contract.
Specifically, existing ferry services over the English Channel and airlines
companies servicing London-Paris pose fierce competition to Eurotunnel.
In addition, cost overruns were considerable, even though no specific problem
was encountered. Roughly, seventy percent of the construction cost overruns rose
from fixed equipment (rails, drainage, cooling, signals). It is believed that three
reasons caused the overrun. First, the conflict resolution system established in the
construction contract was a lengthy arbitration process that could be appealed,
leaving it open-ended. Second, contractors could use arbitration as an excuse to
stop work. And third, penalties for late delivery were lower than Eurotunnel's costs.
This meant delays were expensive for Eurotunnel, but not for the contractor.
Delays, in turn, required bigger loans, meaning the banks could claim the deal was
getting riskier and so raise their fees. During the project's life, construction costs
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doubled from about $4 billion to $8 billion. Financial costs tripled from less than $5
billion to $13 biion.
As a way to palliate the current deficit, in May 1996, the French president
Jacques Chirac suggested to British prime minister John Major that the two
governments extend Eurotunnel's lease from 55 to 99 years. That is an important




Bridge is a 13.5 km.
high-level bridge structure
linking Cape Tormentine in
New Brunswick to Borden in
Prince Edward Island. This
CAN$840.0 million (1988
dollars) bridge replaces an
existing ferry service
between these two points that, pursuant to Project Agreements, ceased operations
upon opening of the bridge facility. The bridge facility and the existing ferry service
are required as a result of a constitutional obligation between the Government of
Canada and the Province of Prince Edward Island which is contained in the Terms
of the Union Agreement executed at the time of Prince Edward Island joining
Confederation in 1873.
The Government of Canada was faced with a ferry service that resulted in ever
increasing subsidy payments and periodic capital replacements. Private enterprise
had approached the Federal Government suggesting a private toll bridge facility
which, together with a continuation of an annual federal subsidy equal to the
operating costs of the existing ferry service, would result in a cost savings and an
3 J. David Pirie, Private/Public Partnership, Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada, March 29-30, 1994
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3.2. Northumberland Bridge3
Figure 3.1. Map Location of the Northumberland Bridge
improved level of service to the Government of Canada and the people of Prince
Edward Island.
The Government listened to this proposal and issued a Request for Proposal
and Prequalification in 1988 which attracted proposals from 12 international
groups. The Government had clear evaluation criteria which reduced this group
from 12 to 7. The remaining 7 were invited to submit preliminary designs,
construction methods, a regional benefits assessment, a preliminary environment
assessment and a full description of the groups' design, construction and project
management capabilities. The initial proposals were not priced, though an outline
of a financial plan and security package was required. The developers were also
required to identify any contract terms and conditions that they would require in
order to proceed with this project. Out of the seven invited bidders, six proposals
were submitted.
Based on well documented evaluation criteria, a detailed evaluation process
was undertaken with all six bidders and requests for clarification were made,
followed by written re-submissions and a further round of discussions and
clarifications. In September of 1988, the Government of Canada announced that
three consortiums had been selected to submit priced proposals and a full
financial plan. The submission of final pricing was delayed in 1988 by a Federal
election and the replacement of several key cabinet ministers.
An environmental review process was also undertaken during this period and,
after initially overcoming some environmental obstacles, a fully priced submission
and details of financial and security packages were submitted in May of 1992. At
this time, the Strait Crossing Consortium was declared the low bidder. Between
May of 1992 and October of 1993, which was the Financial Closing, there was an
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extensive environmental court action which resulted in significant delays. Also
during this time period, there was extensive negotiation to finalize the contract
terms and conditions.
The Northumberland Bridge represented the first significant BOT project
undertaken by the Government of Canada and it was approached with
considerable care and scrutiny by several government departments (Public Works,
Transport, Finance, Environment, Revenue Canada and Justice).
3.2.1. Financial Aspects
There were particular concerns about the security package and the completion
risk. The government's initial position was that this project was a pure privatization
initiative and the Government of Canada should bear no risk whatsoever in any
area.
During the course of negotiations, this position on risk was relaxed, thus
enabling the project to be structured in a manner which was acceptable to the
private sector and the capital markets of Canada.
The main financial criteria of evaluation was that the annual subsidy requested
by the successful bidder could not be greater than CAN$35.0 million (1988
dollars). This CAN$35.0 million sum represented the government's subsidy
payment in 1988 dollars and the government was prepared to commit to paying 35
annual payments fully indexed to inflation, which would commence on the
estimated date of Substantial Completion and continue annually thereafter for 35
years. Also during this 35-year period, the Developer was entitled to charge toll
rates consistent with the toll rates charged for the ferry service the year before the
bridge opened. During the 35-year concession period, the Developer was entitled
to automatically increase toll rates up to 75% of the annual increase in the
consumer price index and in the event certain costs such as insurance premiums
increased beyond inflation, a further adjustment could be requested.
The toll rate structure on this project created a unique legislative problem in
that the laws of Canada prohibit the creation of a monopolistic utility by the private
sector and secondly, required an amendment to the Terms of Union Agreement
between the Federal Government and the Province of Prince Edward Island as to
the replacement of the ferry service with the ultimate bridge facility. These two
issues were addressed by way of passing a constitutional amendment to the terms
of the union agreement. This constitutional amendment entrenched the right to
operate the bridge as a concession facility, provided for the termination of ferry
service upon completion of the bridge and included non-competition covenants by
the Government of Canada during the 35-year concession period.
The financial model was very interesting in that it achieved many positive
results for the government of Canada and the people of Prince Edward Island and
Atlantic Canada, while allowing a structure that would enable the successful
Developer to obtain non-recourse project financing. In this process, the federal
government achieved the following advantages:
1) The subsidy amount bid was marginally less than the CAN$35.0 million in
1988 dollars.
2) The government would save capital costs for the periodic replacement of
the ferries and improvements to docking facilities. This was estimated in
1992 dollars to be worth CAN$250 million.
3) The ferries were periodically shut down due to fog and ice conditions
whereas the bridge facility would provide service and, from time
perspective, would change a 45-minute to one-hour ferry crossing, to a
15-minute trip across the bridge.
4) The people of Prince Edward Island and Atlantic Canada would have a
more reliable and efficient service which would enhance the tourism and
commercial opportunities on Prince Edward Island.
5) During the 35-year period, the automatic increase of toll rates of 75% of the
consumer price index will result in a decrease in toll rates in constant
dollars. At the end of the 35-year concession period, the users of the toll
bridge facility could expect substantial savings as toll rates would be
reduced to cover operating costs only.
6) At the end of the 35-year concession period, the Government of Canada will
receive a reconveyance of the bridge for CAN$1.00 and for the 65 years left
of the 100-year design life, will receive a transportation facility against
which it will have to pay only operating costs (i.e.: no further subsidy to the
bridge owner or continuing subsidy and capital payments had the ferry
service continued).
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7) The annual subsidy to be paid by the Government of Canada is the only
inclusion in the national debt. By committing a stream of annual payments,
the Government of Canada has established "off balance sheet financing" for
this project.
8) This project will create approximately 1500 jobs which will greatly assist the
Atlantic Canada region which suffers from the highest unemployment rates
in the country.
3.2.2. Capital Structure
In structuring this transaction, the Developer's key goal was to create non-
recourse bonds for this project. The developer, working with Gordon Capital
Corporation and CIBC Wood Gundy, developed a Real Estate Bond which was
issued by a company called Strait Crossing Finance Inc. This was a provincial
crown corporation of the Province of New Brunswick and was created to receive
the annual indexed payments from the federal government and would in turn flow
these funds to a trustee for the real rate bond holders. This structure resulted in
the real rate bonds not being exposed to any credit or litigation risk other than the
credit risk of the Government of Canada. Because the original payment was
sourced with the Government of Canada, this particular paper was rated AAA by
Standard & Poor and Moodys. These real rate bonds were placed into the capital
markets of Canada on a private placement basis and attracted comparable pricing
to the real rate bonds issued by the Government of Canada directly. These bonds




In order to achieve this goal in this area, it was necessary for the Government
of Canada to agree to make the first payment to bond holders on May 31, 1997,
the estimated date of completion of the bridge, whether the bridge was completed
or not. This put a unique pressure on the "completion risk" associated with this
project. If the developer was late, the Government of Canada would find itself in
the position of making the first annual indexed subsidy payment and continuing to
operate the ferry service. This was not a risk that was acceptable to the
Government of Canada and in the negotiation process, the developer was required
to reimburse the government for operating costs associated with the ferry service
in the event completion of the bridge was delayed beyond May 31, 1997. A very
extensive security package comprised of parent company guarantees, a CAN$200
million performance bond and a CAN$20 million labor and material payment bond
were supplied to secure the government against the completion risk.
In addition to the "completion risk", the government was very concerned about
the "cost overrun risk". The government required a separate letter of credit for
CAN$73.0 million to be set aside as extra protection against cost overruns. The
government also hired financial advisors, Rothschild of Canada and Doane
Raymond, to undertake an extensive review of the financial model. In addition to
Public Works Canada's own engineers, the government had an independent
engineer, Buckland & Taylor of Vancouver, to extensively review the design,
construction methods, construction price, and schedule of the developer and write
a detailed report approving this program prior to financial closing.
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The developer had focused its main return on the concession period with the
up front real rate bond financing and interest during construction covering the
design and construction costs. In order to maintain a positive return, the developer
had to approach the balance of the contract negotiations to ensure that no
contractual terms during the 35-year concession would negatively affect the
developer's ability to place toll revenue bonds on the project. The developer's
financial advisors were provided with the summaries of negotiating positions and
contract terms to make sure that toll revenue bond holders were not exposed to
risk and credit uncertainties.
There were extensive negotiations
contractual terms and conditions such as:
Standard
* Applicable laws





* Strikes and Lockouts
* Design approval
* Acceptance of construction
* Progress payments
to deal with standard and unusual
Unusual
* Public safety issues
* Public policy issues
* Adjustment to toll rates
* On-competition covenants
* Fisheries compensation
* Impact on Public sector
employees
* Impact on fisheries
* Income taxes and GST treatment
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As noted above, the Government of Canada initially took the position that they
were not prepared to accept any risk. After accepting some financial and
completion risks, albeit well secured from the developer's perspective, the
government was less willing to assume risk in the areas listed above.
At the end of the day, in order for this project to proceed, the Government of
Canada and the developer negotiated a sharing of risk allocation which, from the
developer's perspective, certainly favored the Government of Canada. The
developer, during the process, attempted to focus on risk management and risk
transfer techniques in order to minimize its risk, particularly in areas where it
assumed greater than normal contractor risk.
3.2.4. Lessons Learned
The Northumberland Bridge should not be followed as a model of timeliness.
The project took in excess of five years to finalize with a construction period of
only four years.
Nevertheless, the Northumberland Bridge is the first substantial BOT project
undertaken by the Government of Canada to provide an infrastructure facility. This
project can be used as a model for other privatization projects in a way it has
addressed the financial and completion risks together with the finalization of
normal contractual terms. It clearly illustrates that each individual project must be
carefully analyzed as all projects are different. All projects are not financeable to
the same extent and each individual project has its own unique allocation of risk.
69
The lessons learned during this particular project can be summarized as
follows:
1) Identify and understand the project
* Approach each project with a fresh perspective.
* Identify and discuss the project with proposed public sector partners at
the earliest opportunity.
2) Identify members of the consortium at the earliest opportunity
* Ensure technical/financial capacity and capabilities.
* Build on existing working relationships and alliances.
* Ensure level of commitment is agreed to in terms of dollars and time.
3) Identify political agenda
* Proposed project must be supportable in public domain.
* Early identification of political champion for the specific process or
project.
4) Identify all affected interest groups
* Pro and against.
* The need to identify at the earliest possible stage, a particular interest
group or issue which may affect the project. If only anti-voices exist, it
may be needed to create or sponsor a pro-business group to support the
project.
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The press should be treated as a special interest group and jointly
formulate, with the public sector, a Communication Plan at the early
stages of the project.
5) Early finalization of legislative/regulatory requirements
* This must occur at the front end of the project in order to provide a
comfort level for all participants and to establish contractual framework
for the project.
* This issue is particularly important to financial lenders and given the
cost of pursuing financial proposals in the capital markets of the world,
there can be no room for doubt or uncertainty in this area.
6) Early finalization of timelines for the project
* The Request For Proposals or RFP process must clearly identify the
deadlines associated for the project and address issues of
compensation to the developer where either a project is canceled or
deadlines are extended.
* In order to ensure the best quality of submissions, public sector is slowly
moving towards compensation to bidders where the RFP process is
complex or anticipated to be greater than six months.
* There must be an assumption of responsibility by the public sector
where there is an extensive slippage in schedule due to litigation,
regulatory approval or environmental challenge.
7) Shorten bidder list at first opportunity
* It is in the best interest of both the public and private sector to reduce
the participants in a RFP process as soon as possible. In complex
infrastructure proposals, there should not be more than two or three final
bidders in order to ensure that the best effort and best price of the
participants involved in the project are obtained.
* Until the rules and procedures change, the privatization process is too
expensive for the private sector to participate from start to finish in all
RFP opportunities.
8) Early nomination of an "empowered" negotiating committee
* It is imperative that the public sector establish a negotiating committee
and empower specific individuals to make decisions. These decision
makers should be known to the private sector participants. There should
be no hidden agenda and there should be no "empty chair" negotiations.
All affected agencies within the government must either be part of the
negotiating committee or have delegated their authority to other
members of the negotiating committee. This can best be achieved
through the legislative or regulatory framework.
* Once established, the negotiating committee should not change until
finalization of all project agreements.
9) Maintain flexibility in the financial plan
* Circumstances change, deadlines change and financial markets change.
* The developer must always have some flexibility in its financial plan to
deal with the unexpected.
* The financial plan must provide an adequate rate of return to the
developer and its lender to reflect assumption of risk.
10) Risk allocation
* There must be an early identification of project risks and a reasonable
negotiation process that will equitably allocate these risks.
* Private sector should expect to assume a higher level of risk than a
normal construction bid.
* The public sector cannot assume a zero-risk posture as this will not
allow a properly priced financial proposal and will discourage
participation in subsequent privatization opportunities. Certain risks such
as legislative changes, acts of war, acts of God, environmental or legal
injunction and the collapse of financial markets are risks that will not be
accepted by the capital markets and can only be assumed by the public
sector.
11) Demonstration of full government support
* In addition to providing the necessary legislative and regulatory
framework, the applicable public sector participant must clearly indicate
support for the project frequently throughout the RFP, contract
negotiation and during the marketing of the project financing.
* There should be no policy debates or any expressions of uncertainty
associated with the project once the RFP process has commenced.
12) Encourage the establishment of a relationship of trust
* The private sector is familiar with working with members of the private
sector as consortium and joint venture proposals are common. These
relationships are based on TRUST and based on the fact that generally,
such organizations are like-thinking in their approach to the project.
* The public sector must encourage the establishment a level of TRUST
with the private sector and particularly to ensure that the public sector
discloses all information in its possession with respect to the proposed
project.
There is substantial "common interest" that results in a successful privatization.
Both the public and private sector must learn the lessons from these projects and
learn to establish working relationships which, over time, can ultimately be
founded in mutual respect and trust.
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CHAPTER 4: FINANCIAL EVALUATION
The objective of the present analysis is to evaluate the extent to which the
Bridge is financially feasible under a set of different economic and market
conditions, construction and operating costs, traffic levels, financing sources, and
other matters that play a significant role in the financial robustness of the project.
Since the Bridge is conceived as a Build/Operate/Transfer type of delivery
method, the financial feasibility of the Bridge can be measured through the return
available for the potential concessionaire. This is due to the fact that the
attractiveness of the project from the financial standpoint will depend on the return
it offers in compensation to the concessionaire's investment and ability to face a
great deal of the risks inherent to the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the project. In other words, any BOT project will not be financially
feasible and sound unless it offers a "good" return to the concessionaire.
Therefore, the analysis will be based on a financial model that incorporates
data from traffic projections, toll levels, market conditions, construction costs,
sources of finance, etc., and, on the other hand, it calculates the Concessionaire's
Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) over the net cash flows
as a measure of the financial strength of the project. Such net cash flow or
dividends may then be subject to corporate taxes at the concessionaire's home
country. The financial model does not asses the impact of corporate taxes on the
cash-flow analysis because it is presently unknown the nationality of the future
concessionaire.
The financial model is based on a set of assumptions that will need to be
adjusted in the future according to such factors as sources of financing resorted by
the concessionaire; its risk appetite; market conditions; and final terms and
conditions imposed by the governments of Argentina and Uruguay at the time of
signing the concession contract; among other variables.
Additionally, the model assumes conditions such as economic growth trends in
Argentina and Uruguay, stable inflation rate, currencies vis-A-vis the US Dollar,
sound banking systems, democratic political systems, etc. Disruptions in any of
this presupposed conditions will clearly and adversely impact upon the willingness
of investors and concessionaires to bid and/or invest in this major infrastructure
project.
4.1. Description
The financial model comprises a series of spreadsheets where input data and a
series of formulas interact and produce a set of results. On the basis of these
results, judgments can be made as to the likelihood that the Bridge can be
financed under a variety of traffic projections, economic conditions, financial
arrangements and legal framework.
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The diagram below summarizes the input and output data of the financial
model:
















4.2. Base-Case Scenario: Assumptions4
Since the Treaty for the construction of the Bridge establishes a concession
period of up to 35 years [Annex 1], the model basically assumes that the
concession contract will be signed by the beginning of 1998; construction of the
Bridge will last five years, from 1998 through the end of 2002; and that
concessionaire's operations of the Bridge will span from year 2003 through late
2032. It is assumed that the end of thie concession agreement will take place by
early 2033, when the Bridge will be transferred to the Governments of Argentina
and Uruguay.
Below, various other assumptions of the financial model are described. Such
assumptions are identified in the financial analysis as part of a Base-Case
Scenario.
4.2.1. Construction Expenses
It has been assumed that total construction costs will be of $946.37 million
(late-1994 US Dollars) for a 4-lane alternative.
4 Louis Berger Intemational, Inc., et al., Preliminary Studies - Rio de la Plata Crossing - Executive
Summary, Argentina, June 1995.
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The figure below shows the project construction breakdown in terms of budget
percentages to be spent in a five-year period:
Figure 4.2. Construction Expenditures Breakdown
Specifically, annual construction expenses are estimated to be as follows:
Table 4.1. Annual Construction Expenses
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The estimates above are based on the structural configurations described in
section 2.3 and include expenses in the construction of the Bridge infrastructure,
access routes for interconnection with the existing highway network, construction
and equipment for the border facilities in both countries, as well as the provision of
the necessary equipment for the operation of toll facilities and traffic control
systems.
4.2.2. Sources of Financing
Given the amount of capital required to construct the Bridge, it is extremely
unlikely that any government, financial institution or concessionaire will provide
absolute assurance of capital availability. Particularly, the Governments of
Argentina and Uruguay have clearly stated in Art. 15 of the Treaty that they will not
issue any kind of subsidies or guarantees on behalf of the concessionaire. This
means that various risks will need to be allocated among different parties and that
the financing for the Bridge will be heavily structured, negotiated and crafted in
response to the perceptions of these risk-bearing parties and those of potential
investors. In addition, given the magnitude of the undertaking and its context within
emerging markets, it is likely that foreign investors will perceive a high degree of
risk.
Other important factor will be the assurance of construction completion and
price. It is expected that investors will focus closely on this risk in their decision
making process. Assurances in this area will include time, price, force majeure
events, inflation, environmental compliance, milestone achievement and all other
events controllable by the builder or insurable. Normally, these assurances are
provided through a turnkey contract, but the length of the construction period, the
size of the Project, the historic volatility of inflation and currency values and the
bi-national nature of the undertaking may significantly reduce the number of
bidders/constructors willing to undertake these risks.
A third important consideration is the bi-national structure of the project. While
a Treaty between the nations mitigates certain risks, building a Bridge between
two countries significantly increases the risks of inflation, currency convertibility,
political disruption and adverse changes in law. This represents another
uniqueness to the transaction which could make investors more cautious on this
venture than on other comparable financing.
Below, specific issues concerning the proposed structure are discussed in
order to clearly state the assumptions that have been made and the reasons for
the selection of certain structures.
4.2.2.1. Short-term or Construction Financing
As a Base-Case Scenario, it is assumed that approximately 32% of the
construction costs ($946.37 Dollars) will be financed with equity provided by the
concessionaire and that the latter will raise debt to finance the remaining 68%
through a loan arranged with a syndicate of commercial banks. Thus, the financial
model assumes that the concessionaire will establish the following schedule of
equity investment:
With respect to the construction-debt financing, this aspect of capital raising
will mean an enormous challenge for the concessionaire since it cannot be certain
to find commercial banks willing to syndicate this loan, or that they can negotiate a
business arrangement with the selected concessionaire. In this regard, commercial
banks may.require some assurance which will depend on the creditworthiness of
the particular concessionaire.
Additionally, economic growth and inflation during the construction period will
impact on any toll and traffic projections; the Bridge itself has little value as a
security other than its ability to attract toll-paying travelers. The concessionaire
may try to shift some of these risks to other parties, such as turnkey contractors,
but this could increase the capital costs well above projected levels.
The Channel Tunnel's debt financing is a good example of a syndicated loan
similar to the assumption made for this project. In the Channel Tunnel project, the
concessionaire, Eurotunnel, arranged a syndicated loan for $7.5 Billion (in 1987








Table 4.2. Concessionaire's Equity Investment Schedule
from mid-1988 (early stages of Tunnel's construction) through seven years
thereafter (mid-1995). Repayment of the syndicated loan would commence after
this availability period, and the principal would be fully repaid by late-2005. Thus,
the syndicated loan's maturity would be of 10 years approximately.
In the case of the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge, like in the Channel Tunnel
project, the concessionaire's ability to raise debt on the terms assumed earlier
represents a significant risk. Therefore, such a risk has been accounted for by
assuming that the syndicate loan will have a coupon rate of 14%, which represents
a rate significantly higher than the floating rate quoted by Argentine banks in
January of 1995 for the construction period of the Western Access to Buenos Aires
project (LIBOR of 6.25% + 625 basis points or 12.5%), significantly higher than a
similar floating rate quotation from the International Finance Corporation (LIBOR
of 6.25% + 350 basis points or 9.75%), and higher than Channel Tunnel's interest
rates for the syndicated loan (LIBOR of 9% at that time + 125 basis points or
10.25%).
4.2.2.2. Long-term Financing
The model assumes that the concessionaire will refinance the entire
construction debt amount, including all capitalized interest and fees, upon
completion of the Bridge. This may result from conditional commitments by
multilateral agencies or export credit agencies (ECAs) such as the US. Ex-Im
Bank, development banks, and other financial institutions. However, it is not
expected that these ECAs or other financing sources will commit definitely and
irrevocably to provide an eventual long-term refinancing prior to the construction
completion.
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For a venture of this size, it is common to employ more than one source of
capital. Therefore, three possible sources for long-term debt refinancing have
been identified:
(i) Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)
(ii) International Financial Corporation (IFC)
(iii) Other Syndicated Banks and Financial Institutions
(i) Export Credit Agencies (ECAs)
Many countries should be willing to provide incentives to the concessionaire to
use equipment, steel, toll facilities and similar goods. ECAs such as the US. Ex-Im
Bank compete by offering below-market interest rates and longer than typical
maturities for debt if the proceeds are used to buy manufactured goods from the
source country.
The US. Ex-Im Bank, for instance, has manifested an interest in considering
acceptable forms of limited recourse project finance in Argentina where
reasonable assurance of repayment is based on the project's cash flow rather than
a guarantor. The official lending rates of the US. Ex-Im Bank for loans of maturities
over 8.5 years ranged from 6.54% through 7.83% during the period spanning from
mid-January 1996 to mid-May 1997. In addition, the maximum repayment term is
ten years for relatively poor countries.
It has therefore been assumed that up to 30% of the long-term debt financing
for the Bridge would be obtained from ECAs, at a below-market coupon rate of
10% and at the maximum OECD maturity of ten years for non-power projects. It is
assumed that various ECAs will commit to finance at the outset of construction, but
they would not fund until completion so that the concessionaire would reap the
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maximum benefit for servicing the debt under the 10-year maximum maturity
constraint.
(ii) International Financial Corporation (IFC)
The IFC is regarded by both borrowers and lenders as an institution that
represents worldwide investors in a special way. The IFC has experienced default
rates below those of commercial banks because of its perceived special status. In
many instance, the IFC acts as the lender of record on the entire loan amount.
The IFC has a very active local presence in Argentina. It has a local office and
extensive exposure to many Argentine and Uruguayan issuers (e.g.: Aguas
Argentinas, the Ricchieri toll road, and others). The Bridge, which will unite two
countries to the benefit of the economic and social development of both Argentina
and Uruguay, is within the mission of the IFC.
Specifically, Aguas Argentinas is an international consortium which runs a
30-year private concession of Greater Buenos Aires water and sewerage systems.
Assisted in part by broad-based assistance from IFC over an extended period,
Aguas Argentinas has engineered an extraordinary turnaround of a state
enterprise in decay into an efficient, viable private company. IFC's financial
support to the company's capital investment programs consisted of "A" loans
amounting $80 million and syndicated "B" loans totaling $375 million, among other
contributions made.
Therefore, the financial model assumes as a base-case scenario that the IFC
will provide an "A" Loan, with maturity of 12 years, from its own funds and it will be
also the sole lender of record for a "B" Loan, with maturity of 10 years, syndicated
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among international financial institutions. These "A" and "B" loans will account for
10% and 30% of total construction debt, respectively.
Since IFC loans has a "halo effect" similar to political risk insurance, it has
therefore been assumed a coupon rate of 11%, which is significantly a below
market rate when compared to the 12.5% quoted by Argentine banks in the
Westem Access to Buenos Aires project. This lower spread reflects the fact that
lenders would be prepared to receive a lower return as they believe they are
protected from political risk. It also reflects the tax exemption granted to IFC loans.
With respect to loan maturities, the IFC offers loans with typical maturities of 8
to 12 years, with grace periods and repayment schedules determined on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with the borrower's cash flows needs.
Therefore, it has been assumed maturities for the "A" and "B" Loans of 12 and 10
years, respectively.
(iii) Other Syndicated Banks and Financial Institutions
It is anticipated that these funds could be raised from a variety of sources
including commercial banks, capital markets, Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), and others.
In the specific case of the IDB, it can lend directly to the private sector without
government guarantees for infrastructure projects, whenever greenfield or
refurbishing operations, as a means to encourage other investors and lenders to
participate in energy, transportation, water supply, waste management and
telecommunications. The IDB's participation in a single project is limited to $75
million or 25% of the project's total cost, whichever is lower. Though pricing follows
commercial terms, these loans can have up to 20-year maturities.
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Therefore, as a base-case scenario, it has conservatively assumed a loan from
these variety of financial sources at a 14% interest rate and, like in the Channel
Tunnel project, a 10-year maturity. This loan would account for 30% of total
construction debt. These assumptions reflect uncertainty concerning the source of
this final tranche.
In short, the base-case analysis assumes that the three sources above (ECAs,
IFC and others) should provide all of the permanent financing in the proportions
shown below:














Credit assurance to these sources of finance are accounted for in the financial
model by assuming an annual debt service coverage ratio [revenues - (operating
expenses + sustaining capital expenses + tax) + debt service] greater or equal to
1.2. This coverage ratio is guaranteed by an annual Debt Reserve Fund in the
amount of 20% of annual debt service.
The model also assumes that the concessionaire will cover the balance of any
shortfall in the annual reserve fund with its own equity should the debt coverage
ratio falls below 1.2.
4.2.3. Toll Rates Structure and Traffic Levels Projections
4.2.3.1. Toll Rates Structure
Various toll scenarios were considered within a range of possible values. This
allows for the definition of several toll combinations by vehicle type and travel
purpose, such as commuting, permitting an analysis of toll effects on total traffic.
The following toll rates in Table 4.3. are the key values used in the financial
sensitivity analysis. Tolls rates in bold are applied to the base-case scenario. The
growth rate applied to the tolls structures is 4% in all of the cases.
Table 4.3. Toll Rates Structure
Vehicle Type Toll per Vehicle (in 1997 US$)
Non-commuter cars 30 45 60 75 90 110 115 120
Commuter cars 4 6 8 10 12 15 15.5 16
Buses 120 180 240 300 360 440 460 480
Trucks 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275
These toll levels analyzed appear to be relatively high. Traffic levels are linked
inextricably to economic conditions, wealth levels, inter-country relationships and
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similar factors which can change quickly over the study horizon, or even over the
construction period. Even if growth rates, inflation, and other indices rise and
economic conditions change for the worse, it is expected that toll rates could be
increased commensurably without significant impacts on traffic levels.
4.2.3.2. Traffic Level Projections
The following figure describes the relationship between traffic levels and toll
rates utilized in the financial model:
Figure 4.4. Traffic Levels Projections vs. Toll Rates Structure
Traffic Levels as a function of Toll Rates
30 45 60 75 90
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In the financial model, The above VPD-Toll relationship has been incorporated
into the financial model through the following polynomial function:
IVPD= 9830-32&11T+19.231 -0597! + 0.009 - 6cl0-5  + 1.107 "
where:
VPD = Total Vehicles per Day in Year 2000 (average);
T= Non-commuter car's toll (year 1997 US$) ; 30 < T < 115
Note: The traffic levels resulting from the formula above may not correspond to
those shown in Figure 4.4. due to rounding errors.
Additionally, the financial model assumes the following growth rates and
composition of traffic throughout the 35-year concession period:
Table 4.4. Traffic Composition and Traffic and Tolls Growth Rates
Vehicle Ty;* Ta__Growth Reis
Commuter Cars 16% 9.60% 1.70% 4%
Non-commuter cars 74% 6.10% 4.80% 4%
Buses 3% 4.30% 3.40% 4%
Trucks 7% 8.00% 2.70% 4%
All of the relationships and percentages above are part of the results obtained
from analyses and forecasts of future demand projections of various market
segments defined by passengers and cargo to be serviced by the Bridge. Those
market segments and their respective subdivisions are the following:
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* Passenger traffic diverted to the Bridge (traffic currently crossing the river
using other means), subdivided into the following sub-segments:
* Airplanes
* Buses, using the Uruguay River Bridges
* Cars, using the Uruguay River Bridges
* Passenger (without a car) using the Colonia ferry
* Passengers (without a car) using the Montevideo ferry
* Cars using the Colonia ferry
* Cars using the Montevideo ferry
* Generated passenger traffic (traffic induced to use the Bridge as a result! of
several factors, including reduction in travel costs and time) subdivided into
three sub-segments:
* increase in the frequency of trips made by current travelers
* commuting related to residential and commercial development of the
Uruguayan side or the river delta area (if the toll is sufficiently low)
* new trips generated by those who do not presently cross the river and
would change their behavior due to the existence of the Bridge
* Cargo, subdivided into the following sub-segments:
* medium and long distance transportation (freight between Argentina and
Uruguay, and Argentina and Brazil)
* transportation related to the regional port system
* short distance movements (related to urban development in Colonia, or
the delta area as part of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area)
Based on this segmentation, traffic demand projections take into account
various tolls and rates of competitive means of transportation.
4.2.4. Supplementary Project Revenues
In accordance to Art. 18 of the Treaty (see Annex 1), the financial model
assumes that the Bridge will generate, apart from toll revenues, potential income
streams from roadside ancillary services such as service stations, hotels,
restaurants, and duty free shops.
These incomes have been estimated as follows, and then escalated with a
growth factor of 3.50% over the full concession period:
Table 4.5. Supplementary Project Revenues
Year 2003 Revenues (in US$ millions)
These levels of income are quite modest because they do not account for other
sources of revenues such as right-of-way fees charged to utilities companies for










laying pipelines or telecommunication conduits along the Bridge. It is clear,
however, that even higher levels of revenues from these services will not have a
significant incidence in total revenues.
4.2.5. Operations and Maintenance Expenses
4.2.5.1. Operations
The financial model assumes that total first-year operations expenses will
amount to $11.1 million. Then, an escalation factor of 4% has been applied
throughout the concession period.
4.2.5.2. Maintenance
Basically, maintenance activities has been divided into two categories:
* routine maintenance
* periodic maintenance
Routine maintenance accounts for those activities such as minor repair, crack
sealing, cleaning, painting, and so forth. For simplicity, it has been assumed that
this type of maintenance will commence in the second year of operations (year
2004) and will cost $4 millions. Thereafter, the annual expenditure of this item will
escalate by 4%.
On the other hand, periodic maintenance refers to activities such as major
repairs, resurfacing, delineation, and so forth. For simplicity, it has been assumed
that this type of maintenance will take place in the seventh year of operations
(year 2010) and will cost $6 millions. Thereafter, periodic maintenance will be hld
every other six years, and its cost will escalate by 5%.
4.2.6. Taxes and Disbursements:
In order to encourage the development of the Bridge, the Governments of
Argentina and Uruguay have established in the Treaty that they will not charge the
concessionaire with value-added taxes on construction materials or services and
toll revenues (Art. 16-1).
Nevertheless, Art. 16-4 sets forth that toll revenues will be subject to gross
income taxes. Therefore, total revenue streams in the financial model are subject
to 5% gross income tax.
Art. 30-2 sets forth that the concessionaire should finance the Management
Commission of the Bridge, which will be the bi-national governmental author ity
representing both Argentina and Uruguay [Annex 1]. However, this expenditure
has not been included in the financial model since it is considered that !its
incidence on the financial scheme is negligible.
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4.2.7. Risk Assessment and Concessionaire's Hurdle Discount Factor
4.2.7.1. Risk Assessment
Only 20 percent of the projects that are seriously considered are successfully
completed. Some of the causes for this high failure rate are delays in adoption anid
completion (with consequent delays in the contemplated revenue flow), techniIal
failure, poor management, and legislative or regulatory changes. The key to
accurate forecasting and successful project finance, then, is to identify ahd
manage these risks.
Although little can be done to alter the underlying risk of a project, allocation of
the various types of risk to those participants best able to handle them does
reduce a project's overall riskiness. It is expected, therefore, that the
concessionaire would comprise a group of reputable companies which 1ill
apportion the investment into separate and distinct "shares" according to each
partner's ability to deal with any particular risk.
Several key risks to be borne primarily by the concessionaire group are
summarily identified below. A risk analysis will cover all phases of the project,
namely development, construction, and operations. By assessing these risks, it
will then be possible to account them for in the NPV and IRR analysis through
adequate risk-adjusted discount factor.
4.2.7.1.1. Risks at Development Phase
Because funding is essentially venture capital at this stage, commercial banks
are reluctant to provide seed money. It has been assumed in section 2.4.4.1 that
up to 30% of construction expenses will be funded with equity provided by the
concessionaire.
Therefore, the main risk identified in this stage is credit risk which has to do
with the creditworthiness of the individual concessionaire and the project as a
whole. It is expected that this risk will be minimum since there are presently
indications that reputable companies are interested in bidding on this project.
4.2.7.1.2. Risks at Construction Phase
Interruptions at any point during construction may delay the revenue flow and
hence jeopardize completion of the project and timely repayment of its debt.
In the case of the Bridge, these issues may mainly arise from the following
uncertainties:
Completion risk: typically, the trend is to assign the risk that the project may
never reach the operating stage to engineering and construction (E&C)
contractors. The contractors, in turn, allocate segments of completion risk to
equipment and material suppliers. The concessionaire may prefer a turnkey
arrangement in which the primary E&C contractor assumes responsibility for
completion of the entire project, but this will be difficult to obtain.
One alternative to minimize this risk, though, would be that the primary E&C
contractor had vast experience in this sort of Bridge construction and that it also
were part of the concessionaire group. This way will give further incentive to the
E&C contractor's performance and the consortium will benefit from the expertise of
one of its members in handling this risk.
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Cost overrun risk: Any cost overrun will ultimately be borne by the
concessionaire. Due to the magnitude of the project, it is highly unlikely that any
commercial bank or financial institution may pre-commit cost overrun financing.
Like before, the concessionaire would minimize this risk by counting on a
sound and reputable E&C contractor as part of the joint venture.
Even though fixed-price construction contract may not be available at the start
of the project, such an arrangement may be negotiated later if subcontractor bids
can be obtained on that basis. This would also help to minimize this risk.
Political risk: Included here are legislative or regulatory changes that occur
during project construction - particularly tax laws and environmental regulations'
as well as the possibility that governments will disallow repatriation of funds. In the
case of the Bridge, political risk is mitigated by the political commitment
demonstrated by the governments of Argentina and Uruguay in signing a
Bi-national Treaty that grants an institutional support to the initiative. Specifically,
this support is materialized by the fact that both governments have committed in
the Treaty to charge no value-added taxes to the concessionaire and to allow no
construction of a competitive fixed crossing over the Rio de la Plata during the
concession period.
As for environmental regulations, Art. 10 of the Treaty establishes that the
concessionaire is responsible for carrying out a permanent environmental
protection program in accordance to existing environmental regulations of both
countries. Therefore, there are some provisions in this respect even though they
seem to be vague. From the perspective of the concessionaire, this fact poses
another responsibility that undoubtedly increments the political risk of the project.
Other political factor that favors the construction of the Bridge is the
MERCOSUR agreement which will bring the Bridge's area of influence to a more
regional preponderance both economically and socially.
It is expected that the concessionaire could hedge against political risk by joint
venturing with an experienced local partner and by eventually purchasing
insurance from financial institutions such as the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC).
4.2.7.1.3. Risks at Operations Phase
Once the project has been successfully completed, the financing terms of the
debt portion of the capital can normally be more favorably negotiated. Also, some
of the risks have been resolved, since the project is operational at this stage. The
following risk remain, however:
Off-take risk: this refers to the risk that the project may not meet revenue
projections due to market price changes and actual traffic below to forecast levels.
This is the most important risk that the concessionaire has to deal with since
there will be no guarantees provided by the Governments of Argentina and
Uruguay. To make things worse, it is obvious that there is no possibility for
potential bidders to directly gauge actual traffic because there is no Bridge.
Therefore, bidders are to conduct thorough and comprehensive traffic analysis in
order to whether validate or not the financial viability of the venture.
In a broader sense, it is expected that this risk will be mitigated by offering to
the users excellent support services and a competitive alternative when compared
to other existing means of transportation.
Currency Risk: foreign exchange rate fluctuations may affect project revenues
or expenses paid out in foreign currency.
Since 1991 the Argentine Peso is tied up to the US Dollar on a one-to-one
basis. It is expected, therefore, that this parity continues at least throughout
construction.
To mitigate this risk, mainly in recurring transactions such as collecting
revenues, the concessionaire may recur to hedge with either a series of long-date
forward currency contracts or swaps.
This risk cannot be reliably estimated and are not commonly provided for
contractually. The concessionaire should assume this risk itself, though there
might be growing pressure for lenders to assume some portion of the currency
risk's cost.
4.2.7.2. Concessionaire's Hurdle Discount Factor
At this point, it is important to make a distinction between (risk-adjusted)
discount factor and internal rate of return.
Discount factor - r - is the expected rate of return offered by other investments
equivalent in risk to the project evaluated. It is established in the capital markets.
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Internal rate of return - IRR, in contrast, is the particular discount factor that
makes NPV=0. Therefore, it is a profitability measure which depends solely on the
amount and timing of the project cash flows.
Therefore, if r is less than IRR, then the project is viable since its NPV is
positive. This means that the investor would realize a higher rate of return out of
the project than what other asset or securities of equivalent risk would have
otherwise reported. If r is equal to IRR, the investor is indifferent as to invest in
either the project evaluated or other market securities or assets of equivalent risk.
If r is higher than IRR, the project definitely offers a lower rate of return than what
the investor would realize by investing in securities of equivalent risk.
It is then clear that an important component of the financial evaluation of the
project is to adopt an adequate r that reflects the overall riskiness of it. In other
words, r will depend on the particular willingness of each bidder to undertake the
risks poised by the venture in exchange of the return they could realize out of it.
Since there is little antecedent as to how investors and bidders would rate a
project similar to the characteristics of and conditions posed by the Bridge, it has
arbitrarily been assumed that the concessionaire's hurdle rate of return will be
20%. This rate is well above the current returns offered by equity and bond
markets.
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4.3. Components of the Financial Model
The following tables comprise the financial model:
* Base-Case Scenario's Assumptions and Concessionaire's NPV and IRR
* Project's Cash Flow (1997-2002)
* Project's Cash Flow (2003-2008)
* Project's Cash Flow (2009-2014)
* Project's Cash Flow (2015-2020)
* Project's Cash Flow (2021-2026)
* Project's Cash Flow (2027-2032)
* Traffic Levels and Toll Rates
* Debt and Interest Schedule
* Export Credit Agencies Debt and Interest Schedule
* IFC - Tranche-A Debt and Interest Schedule
* IFC - Tranche-B Debt and Interest Schedule
* Syndicate of Banks Debt and Interest Schedule
* Capital Expenditure and Depreciation Schedule
4.4. Base-Case Scenario: Results
The concessionaire's NPV and IRR as well as the results derived from the
base-case scenario's assumptions are tabulated below:
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Buenos Aires - Colonia Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where indicated)
ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCESSIONAIRE'S NPV and IRR
O&M exoenmes
Total Cantction Costs = $ 946.37
constxcdon incrm see 0%
Interest Costs= $ 282.22
Financing costs- $ 33.12
Equity Irweament= $ 311.70
equity %(basecont. costs)- 33%
Interest Rate= 14.00%
100.00%
3.50% of Const. costs
100.00%
operation eenses (1st. yer operations) $
operamng eop. growth riten
maintenance erpenses (3rd. year operatlons) $
routine maintenance growth ratem
periodic maint. epenses (1st. periodic maint.)- $
periodicty a-
periodic maint. growth rate-
I I i hi
1008( 10.60% 1 p100.251 10.56% J S32VU1
1999 23.41% 1 $221.501 23.42% 1 $73.00
2000 28.00% I $2.80o 28.10% $87.60
2 0012 29.18% $2~76.16 0 V1% I 1U
20021 8.73% I $82.62 8.73% s$27.20
Complemenry Pro~ect Incamey. 2003)m








Ex-m Bank debt 30 285.00 10% 10
IFC-Tranche A Debt 10% $ 95.00 11% 12
IFC-Tranch B Debt 30% $ 285.00 11% 10
of Banrs 30% $ 285.00 14% 10
Traffic and Toll leveb
Non-commuter cars toll-
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Buenos Aires - Colonia Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where Indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (1997-2002)
Induc 1 2 3• 4 5
GROSS REVENUES
Tal ReenuesComplenmteny PmJ eIncome
Total Grss RevenuesGros Income Tax 5%
OW EXPINSES
Total O&M Eenes
Oe Cash Flor 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CONSTRUCTION FINANCING
Constructon Costs 100.28 221.50 2680 276.16 82.62
Equity nncig 32.90 73.00 87.60 91.00 27.20
Financing Fees 33.12
Total Interst Expenses 7.04 25.45 1.88 84.58 113.26
Canhtucuton-debt Fmnancing 107.54 173.95 230.08 269.74 168.69
LONG-TERM FINANCING
Ex-im Bank Debt Amrtization
IFC-Tranche A Debt Amortiztion
IFC-Tranche B Debt Amortizalon




Debt sic Reserve and 20%
DIvIdends M32.90) (73.00) (87.) 60 (91.00) (27.20)
PV dividends '(27.42) (50.69 .09) 43.89 (10.93)
bAcummulated PV (27.42) (78.11) (128.81) (172.69) (183.21
Buenos Aires - Colonia Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where Indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (2003-2008)
Inde 7 8 9 10 11
GOSS REVENUES
Toll Revenues 264.28 281.42 311.60 337.24 366.14 39839
Compemetary Pr_ Income 3.00 3.11 3.21 3.33 3.44 3.86
Total Gross Revenues 267.28 284.63 314.71 340.67 368.658 398.96
Gross Income Tax 4 5% 12.86 14.23 16.74 17.03 18.43 19.98
OrM EXPENSES
Operwn Epenes 11.10 11.64 12.01 12.46 12.9 13.80
Meintenam Ex m en1e 4.00 4.16 4.33 4.80 4.68
Total O&M Expenses 11.10 11.64 12.01 12 1212.96 13.60








Ex-lm Bank Debt Amortizaon 28.80 28.50 28.50 28.01 28.50 28.80
IFC-Tranche A Debt AmortizaEgn 4.11 4.67 o09 66 a6.30 7.01
IFC-Tranche B Debt Amatizaon 28.0 28.50 28.50 28.80 28.60 28.80
Syndate of Bank Debt Amoatiadon 28. 28.0 28. 28.60 28.50 28.10
Total Interest ene 107.0 97.16 86.67 76.12 66.80 64.81
Ttal Debt Amortlzldon 89.61 90.07 90.89 91.16 91.80 02.62
Total Debt Service 197.21 187.23 177.26 i07.28 157.30 147.33
Debt Service erve Fund 20% 39.44 37.45 345 33.4 31.46 29.47
DIvidends (3.33) 34.08 74.26 110.32 148.40 188.70
PV dividends I.12 9.61 17.27 21.38 23.97 26.40
Acummulted PV (1I4.74) (176.23) (167.98) (13.68.) 12.1). (87.21)
Buenos Aires - Colonla Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where Indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (2009-2014)
Index 12 13 14 16 16 17
GROM REVENUES
Toll Revenues 428.17 463.72 502.25 844.04 89.35 638.49
Comlemens Prjet Income 3.69 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.4
Toal Gross Reenues 432 468 5061 48 84 643
Gross ncome Tax @ 5% 21.89 23 25 27 30 32
O&M EXPENSES
Operdng enes 14.06 14.6 1i.2 1.8 16.4A 17.1
Marnenamnce Expenses 4.87 11.36 11.82 12.29 12.78 13.29
Totdal OM ene 14.05 26.0 27.0 28.1 29.2 30.4








Ex-Im Bank Debt Amlzaon 28.60 28.80 28.60 28.6 0.00 
IFC-Tranche A Debt Amrtizatlon 7.81 8.9 9.687 10.77 11.98 13.34
IFC-Tranche B Debt Amurtlzln 28.80 28.60 28.60 28.60 0.00 0.00
S dteof Banks Debt Amortiz n 28.60 28.60 28.80 28.50 0.00 0.00
tal interest ens 44.05 33.19 22.23 11.16 2.46 1.11
Ttal Debt Amortization 93.31 94.19 96.17 96.27 11.98 13.34
Total Debt Service 137.3 127.38 117.40 107.43 14.4A 14.48
Debt Service Reserve Fund 20% 27.47 28.48 23.48 21.49 2.89 2.89
Dividends 231.40 266.33 313.00 363.72 617.36 663.01
PV dvidends 26.96 24.80 24.38 23.61 27.98 25.38
Acummulted PV (61.2) (36.46) (12.08) 11.53 39.51 64.89
Buenos Aires -Colonla Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (2015-2020)
lnd12
GROSS REVENUES
Toll Reenues 691.78 749.8 812.28 880.29 94.07 1,034.11
Cm m Pro kKIncome 4.8 4.7 4.9 60 6.2 .4
Total Grs Revenues 096 764 817 886 969 1,039
Gros Income Tax a 5% 36 38 41 48 82
O&M EXPENSES
Openting Expenses 17.8 18.8 19.2 20.0 20.8 21.6
Maintenanoe Expenmes 20.4 27.8 29.0 30.1 31.3 32.8
Total O&M Expemnes 38.2 46.3 48.2 60.1 62.1 64.





Com ~ns ft Ananng
LONG-TERM FINANCING
Ex-im Bank Debt Amertizaon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IFC-Tranche A Debt Amrntization 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IFC-Tranche 8 Debt Amatizeion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Syndcate o Banks Debt Anmoztion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total interest eperes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Debt Amortizaion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Debt Service 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0
Debt Service Res e und 20% 0.00 0.00 0.00 00 0.00 0.00
Dividends 623.30 670.24 728.10 790.9 89.20 933.3
PV dividends 23.41 20.98 18.99 17.19 16.6 14.09
Acummulated PV 86.30 109.28 128.27 148.48 181.03 176.11
Buenos Aires - Colonla Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where Indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (2021-2026)
Ind24 2 26 27 2829
GROSS REVENUES
Tol Revnues 1,120. 1,216.19 1,317.44 1,428.41 1,64884 1,79.4
Complemetay Pc Income .8 6 .8 .0 6.2 0.4 6.6
Total Gross ReInues 1,127 1,221 1,323 1,435 1,806 1,686
Grws Income Tax 5% as 61 66 72 78
OM EXPENSES
Operang Expenms 22.5 23.4 24.3 28.3 26.3 27.4
Maintennce Eenees 33.9 42.1 43.8 46.6 47.4 48.3
Total O&M Ejqernes 66.4 66.6 68.1 70.9 73.7 768.




Totd Intmeret E n
LONG-TERM FINANCING __
Ex4m Bak Debt Amoraon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IFC-Tranche A Debt Amrtz n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IFC-Tranche B Debt Amorzeton 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sydcte of Bus Debt Amotizaon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Debt Amruzaion 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Totl interest epenhes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
otal Debt Service 0.00 0.00 0.00 .00 0.00 0.00
Debt Service Reerve Fund 20% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dlvkidnds 1013.86 1094.40 1189.11 1292.00 1403.78 1626.21
PV dividends 12.76 11.47 10.39 9.41 6.82 7.71
Acummulsted PV 187.87 199.34 209.73 219.131 227.8f 231.3
Buenos Aires - Colonia Bridge Project
35 Year Financial Model (Base Case)
(in Millions of US$, except where Indicated)
PROJECT'S CASH FLOW (2027-2032)
S3Inde0 31 321 33 314
~ Reenu 1,82.4 141,970 142.67 2,3204 2,21. 2,4.9
Comlment'y Pn Incomne .8 7.1 7.3 7.6 7.9 .1
Total GOes Revenues 1,828 1,92 2,160 2,332 2,2 2,743
Gross Income Tax 0 0% 91 99 107 117 126 137
O0a EXPENSESOpeam__n_ Em 28.8L 29.6 30.8 32.0 33.3 34.
M.ntneE• pem es 61 .3 60.5 6.9 O6.4 1 , 8.11 70.8
Total O • Eense 79.7 90.1 93.7 97.4 101.3 106.4
Opean Cabs Flow 1677 1793m 1949 2118 2301 2601
conr• suc..o. -
wequbit mmc C.. C..
Finrcing Feesw..
constjcMandbt k e n..
LO TG-TEM F.ANCING
Ex-Im Bu* Debt Anmtizaan 0.00 . 0 0.00 0.00
IFC-Tranche A Debt Am lzan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IFC-Trxnche B Debt Amnrtlzgaon 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SWdcae Of Bagn Debt AmPeora n 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Debt Am z n 0.00 0.00 0. . .0.00 0.00 0.00
Total kDebt 8rvipe 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dbt S rmk e 20% ,0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 .00
DIvikdnds 1687.14 1793.27 1948.71 2117.61 2301.14 2500.56
PV dividends 6.9 6.30 6.70 6.i 4.67 4.23
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CHAPTER 5: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The present analysis intends to understand why and how the project could fail
from the financial standpoint. Such a failure could stem from undesirable
combinations of high toll rates structure; traffic.growth below to expected rates;
unexpected construction delays and overrun costs; higher interest rates than
expected; and the like.
The effect of those combinations can be evaluated by changing the input
variables of the financial model and assessing the consequent variation of the
output parameters, namely the concessionaire's NPV or IRR. Therefore, an IRR
higher than the risk-adjusted discount factor would mean that the project is still
viable financially in spite of unexpected contingencies. This way, it will be possible
to assess the project's financial robustness and identify those factors that may
negatively impact on the venture.
This analysis is entirely subject to the assumptions made in Chapter 4 and will
need to be adjusted to the final terms of the concession agreement and to
peculiarities of the concessionaire.
5.1. Scenarios
The sensitivity analysis was basically based on two different scenarios:
* Scenario I: Base-Case
* Scenario II: One-year Construction Delay
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In scenario I, all of the assumptions made previously in the base-case analysis
has been used.
Instead, Scenario II only differs with Scenario I in the fact that the former
assumes a one-year delay in the construction of the Bridge. Therefore, the
following table illustrates the construction cost breakdown and equity investment
schedule assumed for this scenario:
Table 5.1. Construction Expenditures and Equity Investments Schedules in
Scenario II
It can be noted above that total construction expenses and concessionaire's
equity investment are the same as those assumed in Scenario I.
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1998 5% 47.320 5% 15.590
1999 20% 189.270 20% 62.340
2000 25% 236.590 25% 77.930
2001 25% 236.590 25% 77.930
2002 20% 189.270 20% 62.340
2003 5% 47.320 5% 15.590
TOTAL 100% 946.360 100% 311.720
M
5.2. Input Variables
In the sensitivity analysis, the financial model was subject to variations of the
input variables described below.
5.2.1. Toll Rates Structure
They have been set according to the types of vehicles, namely non-commuter
cars, commuter cars, buses, and trucks. As in the base-case scenario, tolls for
commuter cars and buses are 13.33% and 40.00% of the toll for non-commuter
cars, respectively. Then, sensitivity analysis was performed for non-commuter
cars' toll of $30, $60, $75, and 90$ (1997 US Dollars). Toll for trucks was set at a
fixed price of $275.
In short, the following values for this input variable has been utilized in the
sensitivity analysis:




















5.2.2. Traffic Level Forecasts
It has been used the same traffic composition as in the base-case scenario.
However, sensitivity analysis was performed for two possible traffic growth rates
structures. One such structures is equal to that assumed in the base-case
scenario and the other is equal to 50% of the latter, as shown in the following
table:
Table 5.3. Traffic Growth Rates
Like in the Base-Case Scenario, daily traffic volume corresponding to year
2000 is related to the toll rates structure through the following polynomial function:





















































VPD = Total Vehicles per Day in Year 2000 (average);
T= Non-commuter car's toll (year 1997 US$) ; $30 < T < $90
Note: The traffic levels resulting from the formula above may not correspond to
those shown in Figure 4.4. due to rounding errors.
5.2.3. Construction Costs
The sensitivity analysis contemplated a 10, 20, and 30% increase of the
base-case scenario's construction costs ($946.37 millions; late-1994 US Dollars).
5.2.4. Capital Structure at Construction Stage
Equity/debt of 20%/80%, 40%/60%, and 50%/50% were incorporated in the
sensitivity analysis as possible capital structure proportions. Such proportions are
calculated with respect to construction costs. However, the equity proportion does
not include any further investment made by the concessionaire so as to prevent an
eventual fall of the debt coverage ratio below 1.2, as assumed in section 4.2.2.2.
5.2.5. Construction Debt's Interest Rate
14% is the interest rate utilized in the base-case scenario. The sensitivity
analysis not only includes this rate but also 16%, 18%, and 20%.
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5.2.6. Long-term Debt's Interest Rates and Maturities
Various interest rates and maturities were introduced in the sensitivity analysis
as shown in the following table:
Table 5.4. Variation of Long-term Debt's Coupon Rates and Maturities
NoA 4 +2% &+3% &+4% No change years earlier
ECAs 10% 12% 13% 14% 10 8
IFC's Debt-A 11% 13% 14% 15% 12 10
IFC's Debt-B 11% 13% 14% 15% 10 8
Syndicate 14% 16% 17% 18% 10 8
5.3. Concessionaire's IRRs Under Scenarios I and II
The following figures summarize the results of various runs of the financial
model in which the input variables were changed in order to assess their degree of
incidence in the concessionaire's IRR. Thus, it will be possible to evaluate the
criticality of such variables in the financial scheme of the venture.
Figure 5.2. Toll Rates Structure Variation and 50% Decrease in Traffic Growth
Rate
Toll Rates Structure Variation and 50% Decrease in
Traffic Growth Rate
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Non-commuter cars' toll variation (us$)
Non-commuter cars' toll variation (us$)
30 75 90
1
5.3.1. Incidence of Toll Rates Structure and Traffic Levels
Figure 5.1. Toll Rates Structure Variation
5.3.2. Incidence of Construction Cost Increases
Figure 5.3. Increase in Construction Costs - Scenario I
Figure 5.4. Increase in Construction Costs - Scenario II
Increase in Construction Costs - Scenario II
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Increase in Construction Costs - Scenario I
Non-Comm.CarsnTolL
Rate Structure















Figure 5.5. Increase in Construction Costs and 50% Decrease in Traffic Growth
Rate - Scenario I
Increase in Construction Costs and 50% Decrease in














Figure 5.6. Increase in Construction Costs and 50% Decrease in Traffic Growth




5.3.3. Incidence of Capital Structure Composition
Figure 5.7. Variation of Capital Structure Composition per Toll Rates Structure
- Scenario I
Figure 5.8. Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50% Decrease in




Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50%










Figure 5.9. Variation of Capital Structure Composition per Increase in
Construction Costs - Scenario I








Figure 5.10. Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50% Decrease in
Traffic Growth Rate per Increase in Construction Costs- Scenario I
Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50%
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Figure 5.11. Variation of Capital Structure Composition per Toll Rates Structure
- Scenario II
Figure 5.12. Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50% Decrease in
Traffic Growth Rate per Toll Rates Structure - Scenario II
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Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50%
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Figure 5.13. Variation of Capital Structure Composition per Increase in
Construction Costs - Scenario II
Figure 5.14. Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50% Decrease in
Traffic Growth Rate per Increase in Construction Costs-Scenario II
Variation of Capital Structure Composition and 50%





















5.3.4. Incidence of Construction Debt's Interest Rate
Figure 5.15. Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate - Scenario I
Figure 5.16. Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate and 50% Decrease
in Traffic Growth Rate - Scenario I
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Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate and 50%
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Construction Debt's Interest Rate (%)
Figure 5.17. Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate - Scenario II
Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate - Scenario II
30 Non-Comm.Ca






Construction Debt's Interest Rate (%)
Figure 5.18. Increase in Construction Debt's Interest Rate and 50% Decrease





IFigure 5.20. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and 50%
Decrease in Traffic Growth Rate - Scenario I
Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
and 50% Decrease in Traffic Growth Rate -Scenario I
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5.3.5. Incidence of Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and Maturities
Figure 5.19. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure-Scenario I
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Figure 5.21. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and
Maturities 2 Years Earlier - Scenario I
Figure 5.22. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and
Maturities 2 Years Earlier - 50% decrease in Traffic Growth Rate -
Scenario I
Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
and Maturities 2 Years Earlier - 50% Decrease in Traffic
Growth Rate - Scenario I
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Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
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Figure 5.24. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and 50%
Decrease in Traffic Growth Rate - Scenario II
Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
and 50% Decrease in Traffic Growth Rate - Scenario II
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Figure 5.26. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and
Maturities 2 Years Earlier - 50% decrease in Traffic Growth Rate -
Scenario II
Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
and Maturities 2 Years Earlier - 50% Decrease in Traffic





Figure 5.25. Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure and
Maturities 2 Years Earlier - Scenario II
Increase in Long-term Debt's Interest Rates Structure
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5.3.6. Incidence of Worst-Case Combinations
5.3.6.1. Combination 1
* Scenario I (base-case)
* 50% decrease in traffic growth rates
* 10% increase in construction costs
* 1% increase in construction debt's iriterest rate (i = 15%)
* 1% increase in long-term debt's interest rates structure
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Non-commuter cars' toll variation (us$)
5.3.6.2. Combination 2
* Scenario II (1-year construction delay)
* 50% decrease in traffic growth rates
* 20% increase in construction costs
* 1% increase in construction debt's interest rate (i = 15%)
* 2% increase in long-term debt's interest rates structure and maturities 2
years earlier than base-case
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5.4. Evaluation of the Results
In order to be attractive to potential bidders, a project of this magnitude should
be flexible enough to allow for the concessionaire to still earn a reasonable profit
despite negative contingencies affecting the financial structure of the venture. That
structure is certainly subject to a number of factors ranging from peculiarity of the
concessionaire to final terms of the concession contract and arrangement of
financing sources; to even ultimate changes in the scope of the project yet
unknown at the time of conducting the present thesis research.
The following points summarize some findings of the sensitive analysis.
Despite they do not cover all of the myriad of uncertainties, important conclusions
concerning the financial viability of the project can later be drawn.
When reading the following section, it is important to bear in mind that an
increase (decrease) of the IRR refers to its relative increment (decrement)
produced by the change in the value of the particular input variable analyzed.
5.4.1. Scenario I versus Scenario II
All of the runs of the sensitivity analysis calculated almost equivalent IRRs in
both scenarios regardless the value assumed for any of the input variables of the
financial model.
This fact does not imply, however, that an eventual one-year delay in the
completion of the project would not affect the financial scheme of the venture. The
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delay will inevitably bring an increase of construction costs which are unlikely to
occur in Scenario I (no-delay base case). Such an increase may be due to
overhead costs overrun, among other expenses. Therefore, the IRR for a
particular run of the model will invariably be lower in Scenario II.
As an example of the above, a 10% increase in construction costs under
Scenario II would determine an IRR approximately equal to 24% for a $60 toll rate
(Figure 5.4). Instead, in Scenario I, where no increase is expected, the IRR would
be over 26% for the same toll rate (Figure 5.1).
5.4.2. Increase in Construction Costs
As pointed out before, Scenario II is inexorably linked to an increase in
construction costs. As reflected in Figure 4, this contingency - up to a 30%
increase, could lower the IRR up to 5% with respect to Scenario I
(no-construction-costs-increase case) regardless of the toll rate structure in use.
5.4.3. Increase in Equity Investment Proportion
An unexpected increase in construction costs under Scenario II is likely to
cause a corresponding increment of equity investment. As shown in Figures 5.7
and 5.11, an equity investment proportion ranging from 20 to 50% could lower the
IRR from 2 to 5%, depending upon the toll rate structure applied. The higher the
toll rates, the higher the drop. Should 50% decrease in projected traffic growth
rates came along, then the IRR would decrease only up to 2% (Figures 5.8 and
5.12).
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5.4.4. Toll Rates Structure and Traffic Levels Forecasts
Toll rates structure and traffic levels forecasts impact the most on the
financeability of the project.
Toll rates structures based on tolls ranging from $30 to $90 for non-commuter
cars are correlated with an increase in the IRR of up to 8%, apparently regardless
of traffic growth rates or scenarios (Figures 5.1 and 5.2), increase in construction
costs (Figures 5.3 through 5.6), or short- and long-term debt's interest rates and
maturities (Figures 5.15 through 5.26). However, an increase of equity investment
proportion from 33% (assumption of base-case scenario) through 50% would bring
such an increase in the IRR down from 8 to 7% (Figures 5.7 and 5.11, and 5.8 and
5.12).
Concurrently, a 50% decrease in projected traffic growth rates may cause the
IRR to fall up to 5%, apparently regardless of toll rates structure or scenarios
(Figures 5.1 and 5.2 ), construction costs increase (Figures 5.3 and 5.5, and 5.4
and 5.6), or short- or long-term debt's interest rates and maturities (Figures 5.15
and 5.16, 5.17 and 5.18, 5.19 and 5.20, 5.21 and 5.22, 5.23 and 5.24, and 5.25
and 5.26). Such a decrement in the IRR, however, would fall up to 4% should the
equity investment proportion soar from 33 to 50% (Figures 5.7 and 5.8, and 5.11
and 5.12).
Lastly, toll rates structures ranging from a little below $60 to $90 toll for
non-commuter cars consistently yield an IRR above 20% which is the assumed
concessionaire's hurdle rate or risk-adjusted discount factor (Figures 5.1 through
5.8, 5.11 and 5.12, and 5.15 through 5.26). This trend, however, is not true for all
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the spectrum of the values of input variables analyzed (Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.16,
5.18, 5.20, 5.22, 5.24, 5.26, and 5.27). Furthermore, even the highest toll rates
structures analyzed (based on $90 toll for non-commuter cars) cannot yield an IRR
above the concessionaire's hurdle rate in worst-case combinations of
contingencies (Figure 5.28).
5.4.5. Short- and Long-term Debt's Coupon Rates and Maturities
Short-term debt's interest rate ranging from 14% to 18% determines a decrease
in the IRR of up to 2% approximately, regardless of toll rates structures, traffic
growth rates or scenarios (Figures 5.15 through 5.18). The same is true for
long-term debt's coupon rates increasing up to 4%, also regardless of maturities
(Figures 5.19 through 5.26).
5.5 Implications
5.5.1. Implications of the Sensitive Analysis
In Chapter 4, a financial evaluation of the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge Project
was performed by utilizing a model that incorporates parameters such as capital
expenditures and structures, traffic level forecasts, toll rates schedules, and
financing sources.
The financial model, under a base-case scenario of assumptions, calculated
the developer or concessionaire's Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The
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concessionaire's IRR is the parameter that best gauges the financial strength of
the venture due to the fact that the Bridge will be delivered as a
Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) project. This is true since, under a BOT scheme, the
concessionaire is responsible for the design, construction, financing, operation,
and maintenance of the facility for a 35-year long concession period. Therefore,
the financial feasibility of the project will depend upon the return it offers to the
concessionaire.
All of the risks borne by the concessionaire were accounted for in the financial
model by accordingly adjusting the discount rate to 20%. Such a rate represents
the return that the bidders expect to realize should they undertake the project.
In a base-case scenario, an IRR equal to 28.3% proves that the Bridge is
financially feasible.
The sensitivity analysis proved that the project is financially viable under
certain conditions which are summarized as follows:
* A one-year delay will invariably lower the concessionaire's IRR, thus
jeopardizing the whole financial scheme of the project. This contingency
would bring an increase in construction costs, higher equity investment
proportion, and eventual escalation of long-term debt's coupon rates.
* An eventual increase in construction costs up to 30% could lower the IRR
up to 5%. By completing the project on or before schedule, the
concessionaire would considerably better its IRR.
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* Potential increment of equity investment up to 50% could lower the IRR 2 to
5%, depending on toll rates structure in use and actual traffic growth rates.
Once again, timely completion of the project is critical to minimize the equity
investment. Thus, the concessionaire might be able to set competitive toll
rates and maintain the IRR well above its hurdle rate.
* Toll rates structure should range from below $60 up to $90 toll for
non-commuter cars. The increment of the tolls from $60 to $90 would make
the IRR to increase accordingly up to 3% (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).
* The project could endure a 50% decrease in traffic growth rates forecasts if
other contingencies were either minimal or nonexistent.
* Since the IRR decrease up to 2% should actual debt's interest rates are
higher than expected, the concessionaire have room to negotiate with the
financing sources, acceptable coupon rates and maturities for either the
construction or long-term loans.
5.5.2. Economic Implications
In terms of competitiveness with other modes of transportation, the Bridge
offers an attractive alternative for a toll rate structure based on a $75 toll for
non-commuter cars (base-case scenario). This is illustrated in the following
generic and simple example:
A family comprising two adults and two children aged between 2 and 9 years
travel from Buenos Aires to Montevideo by car through the existing high-speed
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ferry that links both cities. The actual fares for economic class are $46 per adult
and $29 per child, respectively. The fare for the car (weight under 1,200 Kg.) is
$97 (all the prices are denominated in 1997 US Dollars).
In consequence, the family would incur in the following travel cost:
C, = {2 * [0.8 * (46 + 29)] + 0.8 * 97}= $197.6
The 0.8 factor accounts for a possible fare discount made by the owner of the
ferry system in response to the existence of the Bridge.
If the same family traveled by car from Buenos Aires to Montevideo through the
Bridge, it is assumed that they should only pay for the Bridge's toll on their way to
Montevideo. In this case, the family would incur in a lower travel cost, as shown in
the following table ( "Other costs" is an arbitrary assumption) :
Table 5.5. Cost of Travel From Buenos Aires to Montevideo by Car Using the
Bridge Option
Bridge's toll = $ 75
Gasoline = 258 Km. x $0.14/Km. = $ 36
Other costs (e.g.: car's depreciation, maintenance, etc.) = $ 20
C2 = $131
The cost differential between C, and C2 could even absorb
originated by future toll-roads servicing the Bridge.
extra travel cost
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In this example, the family would spend a similar amount of travel time in using
either alternative; that is, three hours time approximately. There are of course
other examples in which the high-speed ferry may outperform the Bridge.
Nevertheless, the example above serve to show the potential competitiveness of
the latter.
However, it always exists the possibility that the owner of the ferry services
enjoys a profit margin high enough to lower the ferry's fares to the point that the
Bridge becomes an expensive option for travel. Therefore, the concessionaire
should pay close attention to this fact and attempt to hedge somehow against this
potential threat to the financial scheme of the venture.
5.5.3. Implications of the Financial Model
The following section sets forth the strengths and weaknesses of the financial
model in order to properly assess the reliability of the results obtained in the
present analysis.
The financial model is based on a series of financial and economic
assumptions. The financial analysis concluded that there are several economic
and financial conditions under which the Bridge could be self-sustaining, making
private financing in the form of a concession feasible.
Economic changes can take place quickly and, if unanticipated, could have a
significant impact on the ability of borrowers to repay dollar loans. Certain aspects
of the analysis should be identified as assumptions, subject to imaginable but
unforeseeable changes. These aspects include:
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(i) the anticipation of economic and political stability during an extended
construction period;
(ii) the assumption of many years of sound economic growth without
remarkable increase of inflation or significant devaluation;
(iii) confidence in the results of a complex traffic model to forecast traffic levels
in a new river crossing;
(iv) the assumption that political risks such as expropriation, legislative
changes and similar events do not occur over the 35-year time horizon;
and
(v) the assumption that this project will attract bidders who would be willing to
provide over $300 million in equity plus any extra investment to cover an
eventual shortfall of the debt service reserve fund as well as to undertake
the risk of a turnkey operation (and other significant risks), while earning
an IRR of 20 to 32% and endure, in a base-case scenario, a payback
period of 15 years.
Each of these assumptions could prove to be incorrect, thus causing an
adverse effect on the project's feasibility.
Nevertheless, there are many reasons to support the suitability of the present
financial analysis.
First, the scope and flexibility of the financial model allow for the generation of
results projected across a wide range of variables.
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Second, there are traffic studies indicating that a significant demand exists,
with a much higher toll rate than the one currently anticipated as the initial toll level
(US$75). This fact would make a toll rates structure more flexible in order to
countervail the effects of a series of adverse events on the project's
implementation.
Third, not all of the possible sources of project income have been included.
Revenues such as ad-valorem taxes, proceeds from land sales/lease around or
near the landfalls of the Bridge, increases in tolls or taxes on other river crossings,
and other similar sources of potential income could be used to provide additional
funds to the concessionaire.
Finally, all of the assumptions concerning coupon rates, maturities and other
financial parameters are somehow conservative, so that it is more likely that there
will be decreases in costs rather than increases.
The results of the financial model, therefore, represent only one of the factors
that would determine the possible financing of the project. The risk level
associated with the financing, construction, and operation of the Bridge is high.
Consequently, it cannot be concluded with total certainty that the proposed facility
is financeable since all of the scenarios are ultimately based on highly volatile
variables. Furthermore, the risk level that must be assumed by the concessionaire
may reduce the number of potential bidders to reputable corporations and firms
grouped in few joint-ventures.
Nonetheless, facts such as the importance of the Bridge, its high profile as an
infrastructure project within the MERCOSUR Agreement, and its potential positive
impact on both Argentina and Uruguay determine that the Bridge is financially
feasible under a Build/Operate/Transfer delivery scheme.
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CHAPTER 6: FINAL CONCLUSIONS
6.1. Introduction
The Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge is deemed to be the paradigm of the
MERCOSUR agreement in the dawn of the 216 century. This project, meant to be
one of the longest bridges of the world, will represent the materialization of many
attempts to physically link Argentina and Uruguay over the Rio de la Plata.
However, this one-billion-dollar undertaking poses many challenges. The most
salient of them is the fact that the project will be delivered through a
Build/Operate/Transfer (BOT) method in which a private concessionaire will
design, build, finance, operate and maintain the facility for a period of up to 35
years at its entire risk since there will be no subsidies nor profitability guarantees
from any of the governments. In return, the consortium will be entitled to charge
tolls to every vehicle using the Bridge in order to recoup its investment plus a
reasonable profit. Upon the end of the concession period, operations of the
Bridge shall turn over to the Governments of Argentina and Uruguay.
The idea of delivering a fixed road link over the Rio de la Plata as a BOT type
of project is due to three factors. The first one is the fact that the Governments of
Argentina and Uruguay do not have the resources to undertake a project of this
magnitude.
Secondly, both countries are experiencing since the early 1990's a wave of
privatization of deficitary state-owned enterprises with a great deal of success.
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Thirdly and most importantly, is that the MERCOSUR agreement fosters a
trend of regional integration that accelerates the demand for better infrastructure
among the Southern Cone countries. This fact requires a degree of efficiency in
the management of resources widely found in the private sector.
As a part of the dynamics created by the MERCOSUR, the Bridge would
complement an existing range of other modes of transportation in the Rio de la
Plata region, namely ferry/maritime services, other road bridges along the Uruguay
River, and air traffic.
From the political standpoint, both countries' governments have clearly stated
their commitment to move this project forward. In this sense, they signed a specific
Treaty on September, 1996. Previously, an ad-hoc bi-national governmental
commission, COBAICO, and private consultants arrived to the conclusion that the
facility is feasible to be delivered as a BOT project under certain economic,
political, and financial conditions.
In January 1997, COBAICO issued the Request for Proposals. It is expected
that the bidding call and awarding process take place between late 1997 and early
1998; that construction spans from mid-1998 through late 2002; and that
operations begin in 2003.
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6.2. Comparison With Similar BOT Projects
In many features, the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge resembles other projects
such as the Channel Tunnel and the Northumberland Bridge in Canada.
Therefore, many conclusions can be drawn from the experience achieved in these
projects.
The Channel Tunnel unfolded a complex yet formidable financial scheme that
involved 220 banks and 745,000 equity shareholders. Despite it turned out to be a
technical success from the engineering point of view, two factors were identified as
possible causes of the present financial distress of the venture.
The first one is that actual toll revenues were simply lower than expected owing
mainly to the competition of existing ferry services and airline companies.
Secondly, construction overruns stemmed from a one-year delay in the
scheduled completion of the project. Paradoxically, it seems that construction
delays were not principally because of technical difficulties encountered during
construction but to a faulty conflict resolution system. Since this system allowed for
lengthy arbitration process, many argue that contractors used the threat of
arbitration - and arbitration itself- as a financial weapon whenever a conflict
arose. To make things even worse, penalties for late delivery were seemingly
lower than the concessionaire's costs.
With regard to the Northumberland Bridge, it will be operational as of
mid-1997. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the take-out stage of the 35-year
concession period.
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However, this project stands out as an example of private sector's efficiency in
building a segmented precast concrete bridge in a short construction time
schedule and adverse climate conditions.
One shortfall of this project, although necessary, was the long time it
demanded for getting all of the environmental studies and clearances done at the
development stage. Many negotiations and public hearings took place in order to
reach consensus among a great deal of interested groups.
In addition, this project presents an interesting and sound financial package.
Here, the construction cost of the Bridge has been fully financed in Canadian
capital markets by the concessionaire through the issue of real rate bonds which
are fully indexed to inflation with a guaranteed rate of return. The only public
funding committed to the project is the annual payment by the Government to the
bondholders of $42 million (1992 CAN$) to pay for the Bridge over 35 years. This
amount is equal to the annual operation and maintenance costs of the existing
ferry system which will be stopped once the Bridge becomes operational.
Also, a very extensive security package has been established to protect
bondholders from the risk of construction delays and cost overruns. The package
is comprised of a $200 million performance bond, a $20 million labor and material
payment bond, and a comprehensive insurance package. In addition to the
securities, a letter of credit for $73 million and parent company Joint and Several
Guarantees were required as an extra protection for bondholders against project
risks. Thus, the concessionaire bears 100% of the project cost and completion
risk.
It can be noted, then, the flexibility of the project's financial plan to adapt to
unexpected changes.
150
The Northumberland Bridge made it possible to identify the following points
that both public and private sectors may take into consideration while planning a
BOT project of similar characteristics:
a) Identify and understand the project
b) Identify members of the consortium at the earliest opportunity
c) Identify political agenda
d) Identify all affected interest groups
e) Early finalization of legislative/regulatory requirements
f) Early finalization of timelines for the project
g) Shorten bidder list at first opportunity
h) Early nomination of an empowered negotiating committee
i) Maintain flexibility in the financial plan
j) Establish a reasonable risk allocation
k) Demonstration of full government support
I) Encourage the establishment of a relationship of trust
Points such as a), c), and k) have already occurred in the procurement of the
Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge; others, like e), are underway; and the remainder of
the list will be subject to the particular awarded bidder and other future events and
terms of the concession agreement.
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6.3. Financial Evaluation
Based on the premise that the Bridge will be delivered as a BOT type of
project, its financial feasibility can be measured through the concessionaire's
Internal Rate of Return (IRR). This is due to the fact that the project will not be
financed unless the Bridge offers an attractive return to the concessionaire.
On the other hand, a project like the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge can be
funded through combinations of many financial instruments which will depend on
the concessionaire's ability and capability to package them. In turn, factors such
as stable inflation rates and currencies in both Argentina and Uruguay,
considerable market demand for the Bridge, permanent political and institutional
predisposition to the project, technical contingencies during construction, and the
like, will be determinants to the financial success of the venture.
Therefore, the financial model analyzed in this thesis does not attempt to show
ways for engineering the financing of the Bridge. It only intends to demonstrate
that the Bridge is feasible to be delivered, under certain conditions, as a BOT
project. Further adjustments to the assumptions of the model will need to be made
according to factors and conditions yet unknown in the present.
The financial model - and the sensitivity analysis performed on it, revealed
that the Bridge is self-financeable under a relatively high toll rates structure
(e.g.: toll for non-commuter cars ranging from $60 to $90), even in cases of traffic
growth rates below than expected, cost overruns, and construction delays up to
one year.
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In spite of this apparent high toll rates structure, the Bridge appears to be, in
many cases, quite price competitive as compared to other modes of transportation.
For instance, the Bridge would permit a family, comprised of two adults and two
children, to save around 30% of the expenses it would have otherwise incurred
had the family traveled from Buenos Aires to Montevideo by car and used the
high-speed ferry to link both cities over the Rio de la Plata. Nevertheless, the
concessionaire should be aware of the fact that, for instance, the owners of the
ferry systems may enjoy a high profit margin that would allow them to lower the
fares to a point that the Bridge becomes an expensive option for travel.
These conclusions cannot be taken as certain due to the riskiness of the
venture which may cause adverse disruptions in the assumptions of the financial
model.
Nevertheless, factors such as a current worldwide trend to privatization -
particularly manifested in Argentina and Uruguay, the need of these countries to
enhance their regional highway infrastructure as an strategy to strengthen the
MERCOSUR Agreement, the potential increase of economic development in the
Rio de la Plata area, and the financial feasibility to deliver the project under a BOT
scheme, are positive indicators that the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge may be a
challenge worth to undertake.
153
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Argentine newspaper La Naci6n, edition of Thursday, January 23, 1997.
Carl R. Beidleman, Donna Fletcher, David Vesbosky, On Allocating Risk: The
Essence of Project Finance, Sloan Management Review, Spring 1990,
Volume 31, No. 3, pp.47-55.
CG/LA Infrastructure, US. Trade and Development Agency, Infrastructure
Opportunities in South America, Washington DC., USA, June 1995, pp. VI-3
et al.
Corporate information retrieved from RAILEUROPE World Wide Web pages at
<URL: http//www.raileurope.com/>.
Corporate information from the International Finance Corporation World Wide
Web pages at <URL:http//www.ifc.org/>.
Corporate information retrieved from BUQUEBUS S.A. World Wide Web pages at
<URL:http//www.buquebus.com/>.
Corporate information retrieved from STRAIT CROSSING, Inc. World Wide Web
pages at <URL:http//www.peinet.pe.ca/SCI/>.






on the Ground Series -
Case Studies - Chapter
The Private Sector and
II, International Finance
Information retrieved from the News Agency MERCOPRESS World Wide Web
pages at <URL:http//falkland-malvinas.comnhistory.html>.
Information retrieved from the World Wide Web pages
<URL:http//www.americasnet.comlmauritzlmercosur/english/pageO2.html>.
Information retrieved from The Channel Tunnel World Wide Web pages at
<URL:http//zonesign.demon.co.uk/>.
Information retrieved from the Inter-American Development Bank-Private Sector
World Wide Web pages at <URL:http//www.iadb.org/>.
Information retrieved from the US. Export-Import Bank World Wide Web pages at
<URL:http//www.exim.gov/>.
Information retrieved from International Development research Centre of Canada
World Wide Web pages at <URL://http/www.idrc.ca/>.
Information retrieved from the Organization of American States-SICE World Wide
Web pages at <URL:http//www.sice.oas.org/>.
International Business, "Anatomy of a Failure", July/August 1996, pp. 10-14.
J. David Pirie, Private/Pubic Partnership, Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada,
March 29-30, 1994.
155
Louis Berger International Inc., Bear-Stearns & Co. Inc., Latham & Watkins,
Interim Report No. 4: Economic, Financial and Risk Evaluation, Buenos
Aires, Argentina, pp. 39 et al.
Louis Berger International Inc., Bear-Stearns & Co. Inc., Latham & Watkins,
Preliminary Studies - Rio de la Plata Crossing - Executive Summary,
Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 1995.
Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, Fifth
Edition, McGraw-Hill, 1996.
Sinichi Okano, "A Financial Evaluation of the Eurotunnel Project", S.M. thesis in
Civil Engineering, MIT, May 1988.
The Review of the River Plate, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 8, 1985, pp. 133.
Ibid., March 15, 1990, pp. 145-146
Ibid., July 17, 1991, pp. 8
Ibid., April 30, 1993, pp. 221
Ibid., October 15, 1993, pp. 187
Tratado Entre la Rep0blica Argentina y la Repiblica Oriental del Uruguay para la
Construcci6n de un Puente sobre el Rio de la Plata, Montevideo, Uruguay,
September 20, 1996.
US. Trade and Development Agency, Definitional Mission for Argentina-Uruguay
Bridge, Washington, DC., USA, March 26, 1992.
156
APPENDIX I
Treaty Between The Republic Of Argentina And The Oriental Republic Of
Uruguay For The Construction Of A Bridge Over The Rio De La Plata '
I) DEFINITIONS
Article 1:
For the purpose of this Treaty, it is understood that:
a) "Contracting Parties" are the Republic of Argentina and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay;
b) "Concessionaire" is either the private juridical entity or the association of
private juridical entities awarded with the concession contract;
c) "Management Commission" is the Management Commission of the Buenos
Aires-Colonia Bridge referred to in Article 25;
d) "Bridge" is the project described in Article 3;
s The present Appendix only intends to convey the contents and spirit of the Treaty governing the
construction of the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge. Therefore, this Appendix cannot be deemed as a
formal legal translation into the English language of the original text of the Treaty in the Spanish
language.
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e) "Bidding Documents" are the concession contract and its annexes, the
proposal documents, their clarifications, the Usage of the Bridge
Regulations, and the awarding instruments, in compliance to the contents
of the present Treaty.
II) OBJECTIVE
Article 2:
The Contracting Parties agree upon the construction of a Bridge linking their
respective territories over the Rio de la Plata; that it will be accomplished by rule
of concession in which its holder will be selected from an international public bid of
proponents.
Article 3:
The elements integrating the Bridge are the following:
a) a fixed road link that will unite the territory of the Contracting Parties
through and over the Rio de la Plata, between the area of Punta Lara in the
Republic of Argentina and the proximity of the airport located to the east of
the City of Colonia del Sacramento in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay;
b) the totality of the road connections to the nearest principal route of each of
the Contracting Parties;
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c) the facilities located within the area to be determined in accordance with
Article 6 - §2, that are necessary for the functions of customs, immigration,
sanitation, security, and other authorities;
d) the facilities located within the area to be determined in accordance with
Article 6 - §2, that are affected to toll collection;
e) additional structures, constructions, and facilities located within the area to
be determined in accordance with Article 6 - §2, that are necessary for the
development of activities and services described in Article 18 - §1 and §2 of
this Treaty.
Article 4:
The Contracting Parties agree to be responsible for having the segments of the
main routes linking the road connections of the Bridge and the respective capital
cities and corresponding interchanges, open to public use on the date of
construction completion of the Bridge indicated in the concession contract. Such
segments will have sufficient capacity to bear, at least, the Bridge's traffic capacity
and level of service.
Article 5:
The construction and existence of the Bridge will not affect either the freedom
of navigation on the Rio de la Plata (in accordance with treaties in force signed by
both Contracting Parties or by either of them with third States) nor the rights or
obligations of the Contracting Parties as provided in the Tratado del Rio de la
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Plata y su Frente Maritimo (Treaty of the Rio de la Plata and its Maritime
Waterfront) of November 19, 1973.
Article 6:
1) All of the area occupied by the elements of the Bridge indicated in Article
3 - §a, §b, §c, and §d as well as such elements and those provided in §e of
the same Article, that form a material unit, constitute an international
condominium of equal parts between the Contracting Parties.
2) The area occupied in the territory of each of the Contracting Parties by the
elements integrating the international condominium, will be determined by
the respective Contracting Party, based on the recommendation to be made
by the Management Commission. Such a determination will be formalized
by Exchange of Notes.
Article 7:
In compliance with Article 6, the Contracting Parties agree on distributing the
exercise of jurisdiction according to the following rules:
a) As of the date of the signature of the concession contract, each Contracting
Party will exercise jurisdiction over the part of the project referred to in
Article 3 - §a, near to its territory;
b) Each Contracting Party will hold jurisdiction over the acts that solely affect
its security or that cause effects exclusively in its territory, regardless of the
place of the Bridge where such acts occurred;
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c) The jurisdiction over acts occurring on the Bridge that bring about
consequences in the waters, riverbed, or subsoil of the Rio de la Plata, is
subject to the clauses of the Tratado del Rio de la Plata y su Frente
Maritimo (Treaty of the Rio de la Plata and its Maritime Waterfront) of
November 19, 1973;
d) As for civil liability for traffic accidents, the Convenio sobre Responsabilidad
Emergente de Accidentes de Trdnsito (Agreement of Emerging Liability for
Traffic Accidents) signed by the Contracting Parties on June 8, 1991, will be
applied.
Article 8:
1) The Contracting Parties are liable for timely declaring the necessity or
public use, subject to expropriation, of the areas located in their respective
territories that are determined in Article 6 - §2, as well as for exercising in
their respective jurisdictions those legislative, administrative, and judicial
acts to expropriate or affect such areas and their improvements, or
constitute right-of-way over them.
2) The indemnity amounts for expropriations and expenses of right-of ways will
be for the account of the Concessionaire.
Article 9:
1) The controls of customs, police, immigration, sanitation, and others to be
established by both Contracting Parties, will be regulated by the norms of
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the Accord of Recife for the Application of Integrated Border Control among
the MERCOSUR Countries.
2) The Contracting Parties commit themselves to ensure that the flow of traffic
through these controls will be as fluid as possible, in accordance to the
provisions set forth in the concession contract.
III) THE CONCESSION
Article 10:
1) The concession will be for the executive design and construction of the
Bridge, as well as its operation and maintenance in the condition to be
established in the concession contract. The concession will be for a
maximum term of up to thirty five (35) years at the exclusive cost, charge,
and risk of the Concessionaire. The definitive term of the concession will be
established by the Contracting Parties in the Exchange of Notes.
2) The Concessionaire shall execute a permanent program of environmental
protection, in accordance with enforcing norms of both Contracting Parties.
Article 11:




1) The Concessionaire shall make use of all of the elements of the Bridge
defined in Article 3 - §a, §b, and §d until the end of the concession, upon
which the Concessionaire shall turn them over to the Contracting Parties in
good state of preservation, and without owing the latter to the former any
kind of payment or service provision.
2) The concession contract will establish the rules to be applied to the
elements defined in Article 3 - §e.
Article 13:
1) The operation of the Bridge and its utilization by the users will be subject to
the Usage of the Bridge Regulations which shall be part of the concession
contract.
2) The Bridge will be open on a permanent basis and its use only might be
interrupted by causes as foreseen in the Usage of the Bridge Regulations.
Article 14:




1) The Contracting Parties will not grant subsidies, guarantees or any other
type of assurances for the construction, operation or maintenance of the
Bridge, nor they shall be responsible for levels of traffic or profitability of the
concession.
2) The Contracting Parties guarantee that the Management Commission will
not alter the validity nor the contents of any of the concession contract
clauses agreed upon. In turn, the Contracting Parties commit themselves
not to pass any bill, decree, executive order, or other legal regulation in
their respective juridical ambits that modify the concession contract.
3) The Contracting Parties will abstain from any acts causing the interruption
of the construction of the Bridge as well as taxing or restricting the vehicular
circulation on the Bridge, except in cases related to safety reasons or police
enforcement.
Article 16:
1) The Contracting Parties agree that the design, construction, operation, and
maintenance of the Bridge carried out by the Concessionaire will be
exempted from the Value Added Tax otherwise applicable.
2) The Contracting Parties agree on reimbursing to the Concessionaire the
Value Added Tax included in the real estate acquisition, constructions,
leases, services and other taxable resources utilized in the design,
construction, operation, and maintenance of the Bridge. For such purpose,
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the contractors, subcontractors and suppliers will separately itemize the
corresponding tax in their invoices for services provided to the
Concessionaire.
3) exports bound to the Concessionaire and that will be utilized in the Bridge,
by no means will give rise to incentives or export reimbursement from any of
the Contracting Parties.
4) In regard to the activities referred to in §1 of the present Article, the
Concessionaire shall be solely subject to the following taxation:
a) Gross income tax, which will be determined in each Contracting Party as
a function of the receipts collected from trips originated at that
Contracting Party. The deductions will be computed in proportion to the
aforementioned receipts and in accordance to the applicable legislation
of each Contracting Party;
b) Social security contributions and compensations, in accordance to
clauses to be established in the additional agreement on social security
regulations;
c) Fees for services expressly included in and required by the concession
contract that were effectively provided.
Article 17:
The Contracting Parties will not carry out nor authorize the construction of
other fixed road link over the Rio de la Plata unless the traffic intensity so justify it.
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Article 18:
1) The Concessionaire will be able to utilize the structures of the Bridge as a
support for laying either its own or third party's transmission and transport
conveyors of energy, liquids, gases, and other substances, in accordance to
the provisions set forth in the concession contract.
2) The Concessionaire will be able, within the area determined by Article
6 - §2, to provide with services related to the use of the Bridge, such as
restaurants, duty-free shops, or gas stations, in accordance to the
provisions set forth in the concession contract.
3) The Concessionaire will allow for the Contracting Parties to utilize, either by
themselves or by third intermediaries, the structures of the Bridge for the
purposes indicated in the preceding §1 and §2, in accordance to the
provisions set forth in the concession contract, and if such use does not
negatively affect the main purpose of the Bridge.
Article 19:
The Concessionaire shall carry out the permanent program of environmental
protection indicated in Article 10 - §2, by adopting all of the measures necessary
to either mitigate or prevent negative effects arisen during construction, operation,




The concession contract will include clauses which require that controversies
as to the interpretation or execution of such a contract arising from either the
Contracting Parties or the Management Commission, on one side, and the
Concessionaire, on the other, will be subject to the decision of an international
tribunal of arbitration.
Article 21:
The decision of the international tribunal of arbitration will be definitive and
shall not be appealed to the judicial organs of any State nor to any international
tribunal. Such a decision will be executed as if it were made by a national tribunal
authority.
Article 22:
The Concessionaire shall attempt to assure, when hiring technical and
management staff and workers for the construction, operation and maintenance of
the Bridge, a similar distribution of nationals of both Contracting Parties, according
to the provisions of the concession contract and whenever possible.
Article 23:
The concession will be regulated by the terms of this Treaty, the Bidding
Documents, and applicable norms of International Law.
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Article 24:
The concession contract will be held between the Management Commission
and the Concessionaire.
IV) THE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION
Article 25:
The Management Commission of the Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge is created,
for the purposes of its duty, as an international juridical entity.
Article 26:
The Management Commission will comprise five representatives of each of the
Contracting Parties out of which, one will be a representative of the respective
Ministries of Exterior Relations, one will be from the respective Ministries
competent in public works, and one will be from the Rio de la Plata Management
Commission. As of the beginning of operations on the Bridge, the Contracting
Parties may reduce the number of representatives by Exchange of Notes.
Article 27:
1) The Management Commission will have the following duties:
a) Award the concession and sign the respective contract;
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b) Ensure that the Concessionaire complies with this Treaty, the
concession contract, and the Bidding Documents;
c) Approve and control in an exclusive manner, the permanent program of
environmental protection referred to in Articles 10 - §2 and 19.
2) Other related functions may be added to the Management Commission's
duties and will be assigned by the Contracting Parties in the Statute agreed
upon by Exchange of Notes.
Article 28:
The Contracting Parties will empower the Management Commission of the
Buenos Aires-Colonia Bridge to act when the present Treaty and the agreement by
Exchange of Notes providing the Statute of the Management Commission come
into effect. At that moment, the functions of the Binational Commission of the
Buenos Aires Colonia Bridge created by Exchange of Notes on May 19, 1985, will
come to an end.
Article 29:
The Management Commission will establish its Headquarters in the City of
Buenos Aires from the moment this Treaty comes into force through the
construction period of the Bridge. Upon completion of construction, such




1) The Management Commission will annually submit its proposed budget for
the approval of the Contracting Parties.
2) The Concessionaire will finance the Management Commission by directly
disbursing to the latter a percentage out of the receipts. The Contracting
Parties will finance any shortfall not covered by the aforementioned
disbursement on an equal parts basis.
3) While the Bridge is not operational, the Management Commission's
expenditures will be met by the Contracting Parties on an equal parts basis,
without prejudice to the disbursement made by the Concessionaire in
accordance to the provisions of the concession contract.
Article 31:
The Management Commission shall enter into agreements with each of the
Contracting Parties about Headquarters location and privileges and immunities of
the commission's members and staff, according to international practice.
Article 32:
The Management Commission shall semiannually inform to the Governments of
the Contracting Parties through the Ministries of Exterior Relations.
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V) SETTLEMENT OF CONTROVERSIES
Article 33:
1) All controversies between Contracting Parties about the interpretation or
application of the present Treaty that cannot be settled by direct
negotiations or other peaceful means of their choice, will be submitted to
the decision of a tribunal of arbitration.
2) The tribunal of arbitration shall comprise three members, two of which shall
be designated by each of the Contracting Parties and the third one, who will
chair the tribunal, shall be designated by agreement of both Contracting
Parties.
3) Should there be no agreement, the third member shall be designated by the
President of the International Court of Justice.
VI) ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Article 34:
1) To be applied during construction and operation of the Bridge, the
Contracting Parties shall agree upon and enter into additional accords
related to legislation about social security, labor relations, hygiene and
safety in the workplace, and statutes and procedure regulations of the
tribunals of arbitration provided in Articles 20 and 33.
171
2) These instruments will come into effect once the Contracting Parties
communicate to each other that such instruments have been accepted in
accordance to their respective constitutional structures.
VII) FINAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 35:
The present Treaty will come into force as of the exchange of the ratification
instruments.
Done at the City of Montevideo, Oriental Republic of Uruguay, the twentieth
day of September, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-six, in two original
copies of texts equally authentic.
(Signed by President Carlos S. Menem for the Government of the Republic of
Argentina and by President Julio S. Sanguinetti for the Government of the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay).
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